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ARTICLE

“IDEOLOGY” OR “SITUATION SENSE”? AN
EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF
MOTIVATED REASONING AND
PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT

DAN M. KAHAN,α DAVID HOFFMAN,β DANIELI EVANS,χ NEAL
DEVINS,δ EUGENE LUCCI,π AND KATHERINE CHENGσ
This Article reports the results of a study on whether political predispositions
influence judicial decisionmaking. The study was designed to overcome the two
principal limitations on existing empirical studies that purport to find such an
influence: the use of nonexperimental methods to assess the decisions of actual judges;
and the failure to use actual judges in ideologically-biased-reasoning experiments.
The study involved a sample of sitting judges (n = 253), who, like members of a
general public sample (n = 800), were culturally polarized on climate change,
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marijuana legalization and other contested issues. When the study subjects were
assigned to analyze statutory interpretation problems, however, only the responses of
the general-public subjects and not those of the judges varied in patterns that reflected
the subjects’ cultural values. The responses of a sample of lawyers (n = 217) were
also uninfluenced by their cultural values; the responses of a sample of law students
(n = 284), in contrast, displayed a level of cultural bias only modestly less
pronounced than that observed in the general-public sample. Among the competing
hypotheses tested in the study, the results most supported the position that professional
judgment imparted by legal training and experience confers resistance to identityprotective cognition—a dynamic associated with politically biased information
processing generally—but only for decisions that involve legal reasoning. The
scholarly and practical implications of the findings are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
Are judges politically motivated? Do they make decisions, at least in
ideologically charged cases, on the basis of “policy preferences” or
predispositions?
Most members of the American public think so. Opinion polls suggest
that about three-quarters of Americans believe that judges—U.S. Supreme
Court Justices and lower court jurists alike—base their decisions on their
“personal political views.”1 The charge that judges are “legislating from the
bench” is automatic after decisions involving culturally contested matters—
from gay rights to gun control, affirmative action to stem cell research.2 If a
1 See, e.g., D AVID ROTHMAN , T RUST AND C ONFIDENCE IN THE C ALIFORNIA C OURTS
32 (2005), http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/4_37pubtrust1.pdf [http://perma.cc/QY7U-M9BE]
(“Overall, outcomes are seen by all respondents as least fair for persons who are low-income or who
do not speak English.”); Kathleen Hall Jamieson & Bruce Hardy, Public Understanding of and Support
for the Courts: Annenberg Public Policy Center Judicial Survey Results, ANNENBERG PUB. POL’Y
CENT.
(Oct.
17,
2007),
http://www.annenbergpublicpolicy
center.org/wpcontent/uploads/Judicial_Findings_10-17-20071.pdf [http://perma.cc/FG9B-YG3S] (“75% of
Americans think that a state judge’s ruling is influenced by his or her politics to a great or modest
extent . . . .”); Opinions of the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/06/08/us/politics/ opinions-of-the-supreme-court.html
[http://perma.cc/K6XY-VLVE ] (summarizing a survey in which 76% of respondents believed that
Supreme Court justices “sometimes let personal or political views influence their decisions”). See
generally KEITH J. BYBEE, ALL J UDGES ARE POLITICAL—EXCEPT WHEN THEY ARE NOT:
ACCEPTABLE HYPOCRISIES AND THE RULE OF LAW 8, 112-13 (2010) (collecting and
summarizing survey results indicating that “[t]he notion that state judges are political is indeed
commonly held”).
2 See, e.g., Ramesh Ponnuru, Editorial, When Judicial Activism Suits the Right, N.Y. T IMES , June
23, 2009, at A29 (suggesting that “[j]udicial restraint has also been absent” in cases striking down
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judge rules against an African-American plaintiff suing white officers for
police brutality, or a female criminal defendant asserting the “battered woman
defense,” the decision betrays “bias,” rank or implicit;3 if the judge rules the
other way, then he or she is castigated for engaging in identity politics.4
Experts also share the public’s assessment. Using multivariate regression
models, some purport to measure the quantity of variance in case outcomes
explained by judges’ ideologies.5 Others find evidence for judicial
partisanship in experiments that demonstrate the impact of subconscious
ideological predispositions on members of the public, including law
students.6 The evidence, according to the experts, vindicates the public’s
affirmative action plans); Editorial, Wrong Direction on Stem Cells, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2010, at
A20 (“In a huge overreach, a federal judge has decided that the legal interpretation that has governed
federal support of embryonic stem cell research for more than a decade is invalid.”); Daniel Wilson,
Lawmakers Want Same-Sex Marriage Laws In State Hands, LAW360 (Feb. 11, 2015, 6:51 PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/620597/lawmakers-want-same-sex-marriage-laws-in-state-hands
[http://perma.cc/YEE4-AG6A] (noting that supporters of state legislation banning same-sex
marriage “were struggling against ‘activist court judges overstepping their constitutional authority
by legislating from the bench’”); D. Robert Worley, Judicial Activism and the Second Amendment,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 4, 2013, 6:37 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/d-robertworley/judicial-activism-and-the_b_2412471.html [http://perma.cc/8ZEE-V7LS] (arguing that the
modern interpretation of the Second Amendment is a product of judicial activism).
3 See, e.g., Alex S. Vitale, Why Police Are Rarely Indicted for Misconduct, AL J AZEERA AM . (Nov.
24,
2014,
10:00
PM),
http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/11/ferguson-policemisconductdarrenwilsongrandjury.html [http://perma.cc/KT6U-QPBQ] (arguing that racial
attitudes stifle judicial regulation of police violence against minorities); Miranda S. Spivak, Marissa
(Jan.
26,
2015),
Alexander's
Supporters
Converge
in
Florida,
WOMENSEWS
http://womensenews.org/story/domestic-violence/150124/marissa-alexanders-supporters-convergein-florida [http://perma.cc/LLG8-FSKQ] (“[A] lot of women face [imprisonment] for defending
themselves [against domestic violence] . . . .”).
4 See J AMES Q. W ILSON , M ORAL J UDGMENT: D OES THE ABUSE E XCUSE T HREATEN
OUR LEGAL SYSTEM? 44-70, 111-12 (1997) (arguing that the battered-woman defense is an example
of the law’s receptivity to “excusing accountability for some group defined by their group
membership”); The New York Stop and Frisk Law: Judicial Activism, MYREALITYLAW.ORG (Aug. 14,
2013)
http://www.myrealitylaw.org/the-new-york-stop-and-frisk-law-judicial-activism/
[http://perma.cc/Z3NA-3RPA] (characterizing a judge as “legislat[ing] from the bench” and
engaging in “judicial activism” in upholding a constitutional challenge to police stop-and-frisk
policy).
5 See generally LEE E PSTEIN, W ILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. P OSNER , T HE
BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL
CHOICE (2013) (attempting to characterize judges’ decisions based on ideological scores); JEFFREY
ALLAN SEGAL, HAROLD J. SPAETH & SARA CATHERINE BENESH, THE SUPREME COURT
IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (2005) (conducting studies on state and federal judges in an
attempt to explain their decisionmaking in different ideological categories).
6 See, e.g., E ILEEN B RAMAN , L AW , P OLITICS , AND P ERCEPTION : HOW P OLICY
PREFERENCES INFLUENCE LEGAL REASONING 4-5 (2009) (suggesting that even judges who
believe they are acting objectively are “predisposed to find authority consistent with their attitudes
more convincing than cited authority against desired outcomes”); Eileen Braman & Thomas E.
Nelson, Mechanism of Motivated Reasoning? Analogical Perception in Discrimination Disputes, 51 AM. J.
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impression that judges (despite their own protestations to the contrary) are
just “junior varsity politicians.”7
We disagree—not necessarily with the conclusion that judges are
“politically biased,” but with the premise that existing empirical evidence
furnishes secure grounds for crediting it. Popular judgments obviously are
not conclusive: because members of the public lack legal training (indeed,
lack comprehension of even the most rudimentary elements of the legal
system),8 they necessarily are incapable of reliably assessing the validity of
judicial decisions. Inferences from experiments involving members of the
public—including law students—are suspect for exactly the same reason:
because the subjects in such studies are members of the public, their
vulnerability to unconscious ideological predispositions begs the question of
whether the training and experience that judges possess immunizes them
from such influences when they are engaged in legal reasoning.9
Observational studies that purport to correlate the decisions of real judges
with those judges’ “ideologies” have also been reasonably criticized for
methodological problems. One is the obvious selection bias involved in

POL. SCI. 940, 940 (2007) (“[L]egal training did not appear to attenuate motivated perceptions.”);
Eric Posner & Cass Sunstein, Institutional Flip-Flops (Chi. Pub. Law and Legal Theory Working
Paper
No.
501,
2015),
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1953&context=public_law_and_legal_theory [https://perma.cc/2Z9X-26ZH]
(positing that short-term political commitments cloud decisionmakers’ long-term complex values).
7 See, e.g., Book Discussion on Making Our Democracy Work: A Judge’s View, C-SPAN (Sept.
13, 2010), http://www.c-span.org/video/?297408-1/book-discussion-making-democracy-work-judgesview [http://perma.cc/ZPC2-5EBT] (interview with Justice Stephen Breyer) (cited material at
24:42 of video) (rejecting view that Supreme Court consists of “nine junior varsity politicians”).
Although there does appear to be growing public consensus that the U.S. Supreme Court and other
courts are “political,” whether judges are “too liberal” or “too conservative” is an issue that generally
divides ordinary Americans in patterns characteristic of partisan divides on contentious issues.
Supreme Court’s Favorable Rating Still at Historic Low: Few Conservatives View the Roberts Court as
Conservative, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.people-press.org/2013/03/25/ supremecourts-favorable-rating-still-at-historic-low/ [http://perma.cc/ Z8DC-94LE] (noting that Republicans
tend to see the Supreme Court’s rulings as “liberal” while Democrats tend to see them as
“conservative”).
8 See, e.g., Jamieson & Hardy, supra note 1 (finding that less than one-third of the American
public knows that U.S. Supreme Court rulings cannot be appealed).
9 See Dan M. Kahan, Laws of Cognition and the Cognition of Law, C OGNITION , Feb. 2015, at 56,
59-60 [hereinafter Kahan, Cognition of Law] (noting that studies examining influences of motivated
cognition on legal reasoning are not based on judges); Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court 2010
Term—Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law,
126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 27-28 (2011) [hereinafter Kahan, Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition]
(noting that it is a mistake to infer vulnerability of public to motivated reasoning generalizes to
judges).
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studying only cases that are actually litigated.10 Another is the failure of
researchers to specify the measured outcome variable in a manner that
distinguishes the illicit contribution of political sensibilities extrinsic to law
from the licit contribution of political sensibilities intrinsic to conventional
legal reasoning.11 These methodological shortcomings, critics assert, raise doubts
about the strength of the inferences that can be drawn from these studies.
The most satisfactory way to overcome these limitations, we believe, is
through valid experiments performed on judges.12 In this Article, we present
the results of such an experiment. In this study, judges, lawyers, and law
students were instructed to assess legal problems designed to trigger
unconscious political bias in members of the general public.
The experimental results furnished evidence strongly at odds with the
conclusion that judges are influenced by political predispositions when they
engage in legal reasoning. Judges of diverse cultural outlooks—ones polarized
on their views of the risks of marijuana legalization, climate change, and other
contested issues—converged on results in cases that strongly divided
comparably diverse members of the public. Culturally diverse lawyers also
displayed a high degree of consensus in their legal determinations. Law
students, in contrast, did not; in addressing the legal problems featured in the
experiment, they polarized along the same lines that divided the legally
untrained members of the public, although to a lesser extent.
These results strongly support the hypothesis that professional judgment
can be expected to counteract “identity-protective cognition,” the species of
motivated reasoning known to generate political polarization over risks and
myriad policy and legally consequential facts.13 Legal training and experience,
on this view, endows judges and lawyers with a specialized form of cognitive
10 See generally Jonathan P. Kastellec & Jeffrey R. Lax, Case Selection and the Study of Judicial
Politics, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 407 (2008) (arguing that case selection influences Supreme
Court decisionmaking).
11 See generally Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies That
Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1945-46
(2008) (pointing out that in some cases the law requires moral judgments that, far from “tak[ing]
the form of personal whim or preference . . . can include a situated and disciplined elaboration of
the conventional norms of the American political community”).
12 See Avani Mehta Sood, Motivated Cognition in Legal Judgments-an Analytic Review, 9 ANN .
REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 307, 318 (2013) (“Although much can be gleaned from combining the
experimental literature on motivated cognition with existing work on judicial biases more generally,
there is a need for more targeted and systematic experiments that specifically investigate motivated
cognition in populations of judges.”).
13 See Dan Kahan, Fixing the Communications Failure, 463 N ATURE 296 (2010) (likening
“protective cognition” to “cultural cognition,” in which an individual’s group values influence her
or her risk perceptions and related beliefs); David K. Sherman & Geoffrey L. Cohen, The Psychology
of Self-Defense: Self-Affirmation Theory, 38 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 183 (2006).
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perception—what Karl Llewellyn called “situation sense”14—that reliably
focuses their attention on the features of a case pertinent to its valid
resolution. The results of our experiment support the conclusion that
“situation sense” is sufficiently robust to fix judges’ attention on such
decision-relevant features of a case notwithstanding the tug of influences that
might systematically focus the attention of the public on facts that are
irrelevant—and indeed inimical—to impartial legal decisionmaking. Indeed,
this dynamic creates a source of divergence between expert legal and nonexpert lay assessments of law akin to the divergence between expert and lay
assessments of risk.15
This form of professional judgment, however, does not furnish lawyers or
judges with any special immunity to the reason-disturbing effects of identityprotective cognition outside of the domain of their own expertise. The
domain-specificity of judges’ (and lawyers’) immunity to this form of
motivated reasoning furnishes insight into a variety of more general
questions, including why the capacity and disposition to engage in conscious,
effortful information processing does not mitigate, but rather accentuates, the
polarizing consequences of identity-protective cognition in members of the
public on climate change, gun control, and other culturally charged issues.16
In addition to describing the design and reporting the results of our
experimental study, we also offer a normative assessment of the findings. The
conclusion that judges can in fact be expected to be neutral decisionmakers
in many politically charged cases might be considered welcome news.
But the results also support a conclusion that ought to be a matter of deep
concern for the legal profession: our system of justice lacks reliable practices
for communicating courts’ neutral resolution of divisive matters. As a result
of identity-protective reasoning, diverse members of the public can be
expected to form highly polarized perceptions of facts and highly polarized
judgments about the dictates of the law in cases that resonate with contested
14 See KARL N. LLEWELLYN , T HE C OMMON LAW T RADITION : D ECIDING APPEALS 5961, 121-57, 206-08 (1960) (outlining the similarities and differences of “situation sense” as it applies
to judges and lawyers).
15 See generally HOWARD M ARGOLIS , D EALING WITH RISK : W HY THE P UBLIC AND THE
EXPERTS DISAGREE ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES (1996) (theorizing that lay people miss cases
that generally alter the analysis of risk, while experts take them into account).
16 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive Reflection, 8 J UDGMENT
& DECISION MAKING 407 (2013) (describing research showing that cognitive reflection actually
enhances ideologically motivated decisionmaking rather than mitigates it); Dan M. Kahan, Ellen
Peters, Maggie Wittlin, Paul Slovic, Lisa L. Ouellette, Donald Braman & Gregory Mandel, The
Polarizing Impact of Science Literacy and Numeracy on Perceived Climate Change Risks, 2 NATURE
CLIMATE CHANGE 732 (2012) (citing studies disclaiming the notion that the public division on
climate change rests on education).
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cultural sensibilities. By virtue of their shared “situation sense,” judges of
comparably diverse outlooks might readily converge on outcomes that reflect
legal norms understood not just by judges but by citizens generally to supply
the appropriate guidance for resolving such disputes. But because members
of the public lack exactly that perceptive capacity, they (or a substantial
proportion of them) will predictably understand the outcome of such cases to
be rooted in partisan biases nonetheless.17 Deciding cases neutrally from the
point of view of the law and communicating the neutrality of case outcomes
to members of the public who are not legally trained, in other words, are
completely different things. Judges might be experts at the former. But the
persistent and widespread public sense that they are “politically motivated”
suggests that the latter is not a component of their existing expertise.
Because popular assurance of the law’s neutrality is itself one of the goods
that law is expected to deliver in a liberal democratic society, the results of
the experiment help to expose a serious deficit in the craft of judging.
Remedying that deficit, we will argue, requires use of the same forms of valid
empirical investigation used to identify it in this study.
Our presentation unfolds in five steps. Part I reviews the defects in
existing studies of the influence of ideology on judicial decisionmaking. Part
II presents a short theoretical discussion of competing conjectures on how
the professional judgment of lawyers and judges might be thought to interact
with the cognitive dynamics associated with ideologically biased information
processing. Then in Part III we describe a study designed to test these
conjectures in a manner unconfounded by the defects in existing
investigations of judicial decisionmaking. We present the results of the study
in Part IV. Part V discusses the significance of the results, both scholarly and
practical.
I. EXISTING EMPIRICAL STUDIES AND THEIR LIMITATIONS
This study is intended to contribute to the empirical assessment of the
political impartiality of judicial decisionmaking. It is therefore useful to begin
by reviewing the state of existing scholarship on that topic.
Broadly speaking, empirical investigations of this issue can be divided
into two classes: observational and experimental. Studies of these two
varieties largely agree that “ideological” motivations, conscious or otherwise,
make a contribution to judges’ decisions that cannot otherwise be accounted
for by their use of conventional legal reasoning.
17 See Kahan, Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, supra note 9, at 4 (commenting that both
political parties criticize the Supreme Court for being excessively partisan).
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In this Part, we briefly survey these two classes of studies. We also
identify the grounds on which critics have reasonably questioned the
adequacy of these studies.
A. Observational Studies
Associated with the disciplines of political science and economics, studies
that use observational methods make up the largest share of the literature on
the impact of ideological motivations on judicial decisionmaking. Such
studies use correlational analyses—in the form of multivariate regression
models—that treat the “ideology” of individual judges as one “independent
variable” the impact of which on case outcomes is assessed after “controlling
for” additional influences represented by other “independent variables.”18
There are different methods for measuring judges’ “ideologies,” including
(in the case of federal judges) the party of the appointing President19 and (in
the case of Supreme Court Justices) the covariance of votes among judges
who can be understood to be aligned along some unobserved or latent
ideological continuum.20 Such studies tend to find that “ideology” so
measured explains a “statistically significant” increment of variance in judicial
determinations. Studies looking at the decisions of federal courts of appeals,
which assign cases to three-judge panels for determination, also find that the
impact of ideology so measured can be either accentuated or muted
depending on the ideological composition of judges on the particular panel.21

18 See generally EPSTEIN, POSNER & LANDES, supra note 5 (using this method to classify
judicial ideologies).
19 See, e.g., C ASS R. SUNSTEIN, D AVID S CHKADE , LISA M. E LLMAN & ANDRES S AWICKI ,
ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006).
Political scientists have enriched this measure in important and innovative ways that take account
of, among other things, interactions between the appointing President and the confirming Senate.
See generally Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Jeffrey A. Segal & Chad Westerland, The Judicial
Common Space, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 303 (2007) (critiquing past efforts to quantify political
analyses of the judiciary and offering new methodology); Michael W. Giles, Virginia A Hettinger
& Todd Peppers, Picking Federal Judges: A Note on Policy and Partisan Selection Agendas, 54 POL. RES .
Q. 623 (2001) (using a methodology that analyzes federal courts of appeals and their appointments
in relation to senatorial preferences).
20 See generally Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation Via
Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002)
(explaining a formula-based study intended to reveal political preferences of Supreme Court Justices
over time). But see Joseph Bafumi, Andrew Gelman, David K. Park & Noah Kaplan, Practical Issues
in Implementing and Understanding Bayesian Ideal Point Estimation, 13 POL. ANALYSIS 171, 186 (2005)
(questioning the validity of the methodology used to array Justices and predict Supreme Court case
outcomes).
21 See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Congressional Influence on Judicial Behavior? An Empirical
Examination of Challenges to Agency Action in the D.C. Circuit, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1100, 1104 (2001)
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Critics of these studies identify methodological problems that they
believe constrain the strength of the inferences that can be drawn from
them.22 The most obvious of these is the sampling bias introduced by parties’
conscious selection of cases for litigation.23
Parties are less likely to pursue litigation, either by filing the initial
complaint or by appealing an adverse decision, when they recognize that a
favorable outcome is highly unlikely. These cases either will not be filed or
will be readily settled. Accordingly, the sample of cases featured in
observational studies will be skewed toward ones where the outcomes are
uncertain relative to the criteria that litigants have reason to know will
influence judges. Any analysis confined to those cases, then, will necessarily
understate the effective influence of the most effective outcome determinants,
the impact of which consists primarily in steering a much larger class of cases
away from litigation—and simply in regulating parties’ behavior in a manner
that makes litigation unnecessary.
Imagine, for example, that 99.99% of the effective universe of potential
legal disputes, including many ideologically charged ones, were effectively
removed from the sample of litigated cases by parties’ accurate perception
that judges, despite their diverse ideologies, would agree on the proper
results. Any inference that judges are “ideologically biased” based on the
remaining 0.01% (1/10,000th) of potential cases—the ones that by hypothesis
are indeterminate when assessed by non-ideological criteria—would grossly
overstate the impact of “ideology” on judicial reasoning.
We do not know, of course, what fraction of non-litigated disputes are
removed from the observational sample by the parties’ accurate perception
that the outcomes would be a foregone conclusion. Indeed, we do not know
what fraction of those “missing” observations are ones that reflect the parties’
accurate perception that judges’ ideological predispositions would have
dictated the results. But without access to such evidence—and with no way
to form estimates that do not assume the answers to the very questions that
are the occasion for conducting such studies—no inferences can be drawn
about the true effect of outcome-determinates from the class of observed
cases.

(examining D.C. Circuit decisions involving health and safety regulations to determine if political
party appointment affected case outcomes).
22 See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 11, at 1922 (noting several methodological issues with
empirical studies of judicial decisions).
23 See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 4 (1984) (arguing that litigants are economically motivated and likely choose to pursue
cases based on cost or likelihood of success).
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Known as the “Priest–Klein” effect,24 this form of selection bias is
understood to pose serious—many say decisive—obstacles to the use of
observational studies for assessing the impact of changes in law or procedure
on case outcomes. The implications for drawing inferences about the “true”
impact of the political outlooks of judges is just as devastating.25 While
sometimes acknowledged, the problems the Priest–Klein effect poses for
observational investigation of the impact of judicial ideology have not been
systematically addressed by those engaged in this form of analysis.26
Another more subtle but equally serious problem for observational studies
of judicial ideology is the classification of the dependent variable—“case
outcomes.” In order to measure the impact of a judge’s “ideology” on
decisionmaking, it is necessary to determine which outcomes are consistent
with that judge’s ideology and which ones are not. Scholars doing
observational studies generally classify outcomes as “liberal” or
“conservative” based on the type of case and the prevailing party. For
example, decisions favoring the government in “criminal” cases are deemed
“conservative” and those favoring the defendant “liberal”; in labor law cases,

24 See generally Richard L. Revesz, A Defense of Empirical Legal Scholarship, 69 U. C HI . L. REV.
169, 172-75 (2002). Note that the authors explore the converse situation to the one discussed supra.
Namely, the authors suggest that parties may accurately perceive a common ideological bias among
judges, and would be deterred from bringing cases that would likely be resolved unfavorably because
of the judges’ common ideological bias; the resulting observations would therefore understate the
effects of ideology on judicial decisionmaking. Id. (discussing the hypothetical “rightward shift” of
judges).
25 See Kastellec & Lax, supra note 10.
26 See, e.g., SUNSTEIN , S CHKADE , E LLMAN & SAWICKI , supra note 19, at 126 (questioning
the level of inferences that can be drawn when tracking judges’ ideological preferences). Typically,
such commentators are content to note that it is not the case that plaintiffs win 50% of the time, a
theoretical implication of the formal model that Priest and Klein developed to present their
argument. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, CALIF. L.
REV. 1457, 1495-97 (2003) (finding that the 50% hypothesis is not supported by empirical evidence);
Christopher Zorn & Jennifer Barnes Bowie, Ideological Influences on Decision Making in the Federal
Judicial Hierarchy: An Empirical Assessment, 72 J. POL. 1212, 1218 (2010) (questioning the importance
of the Priest–Klein effect and finding that factors such as judges’ policy preferences are more
influential). This is an unconvincing rejoinder. The Priest–Klein effect is not an empirical
“hypothesis” that can be “disproven” by examining the success rates of particular classes of litigants.
It is a logical point about how the biasing influences of unobserved variables in studies of litigated
case outcomes affect the inferences that can be drawn from them. So long as there is reason to
believe the dynamics the Priest–Klein effect identifies are at work, and unless one possesses some
valid means for taking account of their impact, inferences drawn from litigated cases will be
empirically unreliable. The observation that plaintiffs do not win 50% of the time does not supply
any reason to doubt that parties’ expectations about their prospects for success have an impact on
the sample available for study in observational studies of judicial decisionmaking. It highlights only
the deep uncertainty about exactly how much and in what ways litigation-selection effects bias
estimates of outcome determinants in litigated cases.
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outcomes are “conservative” if they favor “management,” and “liberal” if they
favor unions, and so forth.27
The crudeness of this scheme not only injects noise into empirical
analyses of case outcomes but also biases it toward overstated estimates of the
impact of “ideology” on judicial decisionmaking.28 It is a well-known feature
of the Anglo-American system of law that it frequently demands that judges
resort to normative reasoning.29 There is no way for highly general concepts
such as “fraud,” “unreasonable seizure,” “unlawful restraint of trade,” “fair
use,” “materiality,” “freedom of speech,” and the like to be made operative in
particular cases without specifying what states of affairs those legal provisions
should be trying to promote.30 Under the “common law” style of reasoning
dominant in Anglo-American law,31 the sorts of moral judgments that judges
exercise to supply content to these types of concepts is not unconstrained;
shared understandings of the general aim of the enacting legislature or other
law promulgator, the appropriate deference to be afforded to previous
elaborations of the content of the legal concept in question, and conformity
to broader normative precepts that structure the law (“notice and opportunity
to be heard,” “due process,” “like cases treated alike,” etc.) limit the available
interpretive options. But in ruling out many solutions, the sources of valid
normative inspiration that judges can draw on often do not rule only one in.32
27 See, e.g., FRANK B. C ROSS , D ECISION M AKING IN THE U.S. C OURTS OF APPEALS 20
(2007) (discussing examples of ideological codifications for different types of case outcomes as well
as the problems associated with these codifications); EPSTEIN, LANDES , & POSNER, supra note 5
at 107-16 (noting that the definitions of “liberal” and “conservative” have changed over time);
SUNSTEIN , SCHKADE, ELLMAN & SAWICKI, supra note 19 (explaining the methodology behind
a study of three-judge panel decisions that used “liberal” or “conservative” to classify case outcomes).
28 See e.g., Edwards & Livermore, supra note 11, at 1945-48 (arguing that judges’ ideologies are
not necessarily extrinsic to the law, and that studies using measures of “liberal” and “conservative”
fail to account for this); Carolyn Shapiro, Coding Complexity: Bringing Law to the Empirical Analysis
of the Supreme Court, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 477, 485-88 (2009) (criticizing previous studies that simplify
judicial opinions into a liberal–conservative dichotomy).
29 See generally RONALD D WORKIN , LAW ’ S E MPIRE (1986) (providing an overview of
different legal theories and their varying emphasis on judges’ normative reasoning); E DWARD H.
LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (2013) (providing a realist explanation to legal
reasoning).
30 See Neal Devins, How State Supreme Courts Take Consequences into Account: Toward a StateCentered Understanding of State Constitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1629, 1655-56 (2009) (describing
state court exercise of consequentialist judgment contemplated by conventional understandings of
constitutional jurisprudence).
31 See Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 383, 405 (1964) (discussing persistence of “specialized federal common law”); Thomas W.
Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1985) (describing
ubiquity of statutes that implicitly delegate federal common lawmaking power).
32 See generally D WORKIN , supra note 29; Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Reading Statutes in the Common
Law Tradition, 101 VA. L. REV. 1357 (2015).
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In this environment, it is perfectly commonplace for judges who have
competing “jurisprudential” orientations to disagree on what normative
theory should animate a particular legal provision. It is not a surprise, either,
that in those instances the competing orientations that guide judges will be
correlated with alternative political philosophies or orientations on the part of
the judges in question.33 Justice Douglas had a populist “economic
decentralization” conception of “restraint of trade” for purposes of the
Sherman Act; Professor and then Judge Robert Bork subscribed to an
economic, “consumer welfare” alternative.34 These positions undoubtedly
cohered with their respective political “ideologies,” too, and likely did as well
with the “ideologies” of judges who championed one versus the other
understanding of how U.S. antitrust law should be structured. But those who
understand how the law works—and the contribution that judges, using
normative theories, make, in imparting content to it—would not characterize
this debate as reflecting extralegal “ideological” considerations as opposed to
the perfectly ordinary, acceptable exercise of jurisprudential judgments.35
Multivariate regression models are not necessary to ferret out the
contribution that value-laden theories make to how judges decide these cases;
judges openly admit that they are using such theories. Regardless of which
President appointed these judges to the federal bench, no lawyer understands
judges engaged in this sort of reasoning to be invoking “personal political
preferences.”
An entirely different matter would have been presented, however, had
Justice Douglas or Judge Bork proposed deciding an antitrust, labor law, free
speech, criminal law or any other sort of case based on the religious affiliation
of the litigants or on the contribution a particular outcome would have made
to the electoral prospects of a candidate for President. The Sherman Act, the
Wagner Act, the First Amendment, and even myriad criminal law statutes36
See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 11, at 1947.
Compare C. Paul Rogers III, The Antitrust Legacy of Justice William O. Douglas, 56 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 895, 924-25 (2008), with ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT
WAR WITH ITSELF (1978).
35 See, e.g., Frank Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. C HI . L. REV. 533, 544 (1983) (“The
statute books are full of laws, of which the Sherman Act is a good example, that effectively authorize
courts to create new lines of common law.”); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the
Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 818 (1983) (“[T]he judge will be alert to
any sign of legislative intent regarding the freedom with which he should exercise his interpretive
function. . . . If the legislature enacts into statute law a common law concept, as Congress did when
it forbade agreements in ‘restraint of trade’ in the Sherman Act, that is a clue that the courts are to
interpret the statute with the freedom with which they would construe and apply a common law
principle . . . .”).
36 See United States v. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d 1230, 1239 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Easterbrook,
J., dissenting) (noting that “[the federal aiding and abetting statute] has never been applied
33

34
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all demand the use of the form of guided normative theorizing we are
describing. But the bare desire to use legal outcomes in particular cases (or in
large classes of them) to disadvantage those who subscribe to a disfavored
view of the best life or to advance the cause of a particular political party is
plainly outside the range of considerations that can validly be appealed to in
the exercise of normative reasoning intrinsic to law. Whether in the form of
regression coefficient correlations, law-enforcement wiretaps, or
anonymously leaked emails, evidence that judges of particular ideologies were
being influenced by such considerations would be a ground for intense
concern.
There is a distinction, in sum, between resort to normative considerations
that are internal to law and ones external to it. The former are licit, the latter
illicit, from the perspective that lawyers and judges in the U.S. system of
justice share of what counts as valid legal reasoning.37
The “prevailing party” outcome-classification scheme used in
observational studies of judicial ideology is blind to the distinction. As a
result, such studies will count in their estimates of the influence of “ideology”
perfectly mundane associations between the jurisprudential philosophies of
judges deciding cases on the basis of normative considerations internal to law
and the party of the Presidents who appointed them or the voting records of
those judges and judges who feel likewise about the normative theories that
inform labor law, free speech cases, criminal cases and the like.38
The correlations that these researchers report could also be capturing
judges’ reliance on illicit political considerations, external to the law. But, as
critics point out, there is no way to know whether this is the case, or to what
extent, given the indiscriminate coding of outcome variables that these
studies employ.39
Some candid adherents to the “ideology thesis”40 have acknowledged this
point.41 But they have not supplied a response to what critics would identify

mechanically,” but rather that “its scope depends on the structure and functions of the substantive
statute[,]” the interpretations of which may be guided by normative concerns).
37 See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 11, at 1947-48.
38 See id. at 1927 (noting that outcome-based coding of judicial decisions ignores important
purposes and factors of judicial decisionmaking).
39 See Carolyn Shapiro, The Context of Ideology: Law, Politics, and Empirical Legal Scholarship, 75
MO. L. REV. 1 (2010) (criticizing current ideological coding of judicial decisions).
40 See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 11, at 1959-62 (discussing points of support and
criticism towards the ideology thesis).
41 See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. C HI . L. REV. 831,
844 (2008) (identifying as a “jurisprudential” issue worthy of “further exploration” the possibility
that variance between Democratic and Republican judicial appointees might be explained consistent
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as the significance of this concession. When observational-study proponents
declare that they are finding that “ideology” accounts for judges’ decisions,
they say they are measuring the extent to which those judges are not deciding
cases on the basis of “law.” That is what gives this entire body of literature
its currency—its “shock value.” But to the extent that the observational-study
scholars are finding that judges who have different judicial philosophies will
sometimes validly interpret the law to support different conclusions, then
they are telling us something that already is clear and that gives no one any
reason to be concerned about the quality of judicial decisionmaking.
B. Experimental Studies
Studies that use experimental methods have been used to examine the
impact of motivated reasoning on legal decisionmaking. Motivated reasoning
refers to the tendency of people to conform their assessments of
information—from logical arguments to empirical data, from expert
judgments to their own sense impressions—to some end or goal extrinsic to
judgment accuracy.42
One such interest can be to protect the status of, or one’s own standing
in, an important affinity group, a form of motivated reasoning known as
identity-protective cognition.43 The impact of identity-protective cognition
in distorting assessments of evidence has been identified as an important
source of political polarization over issues like climate change, gun control,
the HPV vaccine, nuclear power, and the like.44
Studies have demonstrated that identity-protective cognition can affect
assessment of evidence relevant to legal decisions, too.45 In mock juror
studies, subjects have been shown to form different assessments of the facts
in cases involving alleged intimidation of pedestrians by political protestors,
excessive force by police, and violent confrontations between private citizens,
depending on the relationship of the group identities and values of the
parties, on the one hand, and the study subjects’ own group commitments,
on the other.46 Studies have also shown that identity-protective cognition can
with “Ronald Dworkin's account of law as a search for ‘integrity,’ through which judges seek both
to ‘fit’ and to "justif[y] preexisting legal decisions”).
42 Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. B ULL. 480, 480-81 (1990).
43 See Sherman & Cohen, supra note 13, at 191-92.
44 See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 13, at 296.
45 See Sood, supra note 12.
46 See Yael Granot, Emily Balcetis, Kristin E. Schneider & Tom R. Tyler, Justice Is Not Blind:
Visual Attention Exaggerates Effects of Group Identification on Legal Punishment, 143 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 2196 (2014); Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman, Donald Braman, Danieli Evans &
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, They Saw a Protest: Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech–Conduct Distinction, 64
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influence the interpretation of formal legal rules—such as those relating to
consent in acquaintance rape cases;47 or the use of deadly violence by battered
women against their abusive mates and by “beleaguered commuters” against
young African-American men.48
These experiments avoid the methodological difficulties that mar
observational studies. In an experiment, the researcher can directly measure
the form of group commitments that she hypothesizes have the potential to
unconsciously bias the decisionmaker. Moreover, she can “select” the case,
designing it in a manner that enables unbiased observation of the
responsiveness of the study subject to experimentally manipulated sources of
identity-protective motivation that are analytically independent of the legal
rules or forms of legal reasoning appropriate for deciding it. If the
experimental manipulation generates the hypothesized differences in the
outcomes of decisionmakers with opposing identities, the inference that their
reasoning was biased by ideological commitments extrinsic to the law is ironclad.
Nonetheless, existing identity-protective cognition experiments suffer
from their own limitation: they have not been performed on judges. Mock
jury studies have involved legally untrained members of the public.49 Studies
involving legal reasoning, too, have involved either members of the public,
or else college or law school students.50
This is a serious limitation.51 Experimental studies of identity-protective
cognition have deepened scientific understanding of human decisionmaking.
But neither the vulnerability of individuals to this bias nor the threat that it
poses to liberal ideals of neutrality comes as a great revelation to the law.52
Doctrines of constitutional law anticipate identity-protective cognition in
legislators: the Free Speech, Due Process, Equal Protection, and Free
Exercise Clauses not only prohibit lawmakers from expressly imposing a
STAN. L. REV. 851 (2012); Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are
You Going to Believe? Scott V. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837
(2009).
47 See Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why, in
Acquaintance-Rape Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 804-06 (2010).
48 See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, The Self-Defensive Cognition of Self-Defense, 45 AM .
CRIM. L. REV. 1, 34-35 (2008).
49 See e.g., id.; Kahan, Hoffman & Braman, supra note 46; Janice Nadler & Mary-Hunter
McDonnell, Moral Character, Motive, and the Psychology of Blame, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 255, 274
(2012); Avani Mehta Sood & John M. Darley, The Plasticity of Harm in the Service of Criminalization
Goals, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1313, 1324-25 (2012).
50 See B RAMAN , supra note 6, at 87; Braman & Nelson, supra note 6, at 945; Ward Farnsworth,
Dustin F. Guzior & Anup Malani, Implicit Bias in Legal Interpretation (John M. Olin Program in Law &
Economics, Working Paper No. 577, 2011).
51 See Sood, supra note 12, at 318.
52 See Kahan, Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, supra note 9, at 4.

2016]

“Ideology” or “Situation Sense”?

365

cultural orthodoxy,53 but also mandate strict scrutiny to flush out hidden
motivations for disadvantaging those who deviate from dominant norms.54
Procedural rules recognize the same vulnerability in jurors, forbidding the
introduction of evidence that might excite aversion to a party’s identity or
values.55 Instilling the reasoning skills and habits of mind essential to
administering these rules in a reliable and even-handed manner is one of—if
not the—central objective of legal training.
Because the entire point of this regime is to insulate the law from the
impact of identity-protective cognition on ordinary members of the public, it
is question-begging to cite the public’s vulnerability to that bias as reason to
believe that it distorts the reasoning of judges as well.56 It is certainly not
unreasonable—indeed, it is quite plausible—to hypothesize that identityprotective cognition could be disabling judges from shielding liberal
democratic government from the threat posed to it by its diverse citizenry’s
own vulnerability to identity-protective cognition. But to the extent that such
conjecture is based on casual observation of how courts resolve controversial
cases, the experimental study of identity-protective cognition actually
furnishes strong evidence to be skeptical of such a surmise: those studies show
us that ordinary members of the public, precisely because they selectively
credit and discredit all manner of information in patterns congenial to their
own cultural predispositions, can be expected to perceive court decisions they
disagree with as biased even if those decisions reflect the impartial application
of neutral principles of law.57
53 See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If there is any fixed
star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion . . . .”).
54 See J OHN HART E LY , D EMOCRACY AND D ISTRUST: A T HEORY 0F J UDICIAL REVIEW
146 (1980) (“[S]pecial scrutiny . . . turns out to be a way of ‘flushing out’ unconstitutional motivation
. . . .”); Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 431 n.55, 453-55, 500-01 (1996) (arguing that the strict
scrutiny standard is a means of measuring government motive in passing laws that disadvantage
certain groups); Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 436-37 (1997) (“[Strict
scrutiny’s] function . . . is to smoke out illegitimate purposes that cannot be a valid basis for state
action under the Equal Protection Clause.”).
55 See, e.g., FED . R. E VID . 404 (barring “character propensity” proof); F ED . R. E VID . 610
(barring “evidence of a witness’s religious beliefs or opinions . . . to attack or support the witness’s
credibility”).
56 Cf. B RAMAN , supra note 6, at 87-89; Braman & Nelson, supra note 6, at 940-45 (implying
that the results of an experiment with students support inferences on how judges reason in legal
decisions).
57 See Kahan, Cognition of Law, supra note 9, at 60. Some judges report believing that identityprotective cognition or related forms of motivated reasoning also affect judicial reasoning. See, e.g.,
RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 116 (2008) (asserting that judges rely on “cultural
cognition” in assessing empirical claims). We do not think that this is relevant evidence. The impact
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The only valid means to test whether judges are prone to ideological bias
as a result of identity-protective cognition is to perform valid identityprotective cognition studies on actual judges.58 No such studies have yet been
performed.59
But two are at least suggestive. In an important recent article, Andrew
Wistrich, Jeffrey Rachlinski, and Chris Guthrie report a series of experiments
that compared the determinations of judges randomly assigned to conditions
that featured either “sympathetic” or “unsympathetic” litigants.60 In one
involving the application of a medical marijuana statute, a larger proportion
of judges accepted the adequacy of a medical-need affidavit proffered by a
middle-aged man who was “married with three children,” “employed as an
accountant,” and who “lacked a “criminal record” than that of a 19-year old
“currently unemployed” man who was “on probation for beating his exgirlfriend, and had a juvenile record for drug possession and drug dealing.”
Similarly, a group of bankruptcy judges were less likely to discharge the debt
of a college student who used a credit card “for spring break, where she
charged her hotel room, meals, and rounds of drinks for friends,” than they
were to discharge that of a student who used the card to visit and buy
medicines for her mother, “who was battling cancer, lacked health insurance,
and needed assistance recovering from a recent surgery.”61 The authors treat
these and similar results as evidence that the judges’ had been “motivated” to
reach outcomes that matched their “emotional” evaluations of the parties.62
Significantly, however, judges of different political ideologies did not react
differently to the experimental stimuli.63 Indeed, Wistrich et al. express
surprise at “the lack of a political influence given the widespread findings [in
observational studies] that politics influences appellate judges.”64 Because
Wistrich et. al report that their experiments furnished “little support for the
proposition that political ideology drives much judicial decision making,”65 it
of unconscious biases on oneself cannot be reliably detected by introspection, much less discerned
in others via casual observation. See generally Emily Pronin, Daniel Y. Lin & Lee Ross, The Bias
Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 369
(2002).
58 Kahan, Cognition of Law, supra note 9, at 60; Kahan, Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition,
supra note 9, at 27-28.
59 See Sood, supra note 12, at 318 (“[T]here is a need for more targeted and systematic
experiments that specifically investigate motivated cognition in populations of judges.”).
60 See Andrew J. Wistrich, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Chris Guthrie, Heart Versus Head: Do Judges
Follow the Law of Follow Their Feelings?, 93 Tex. L. Rev. 855 (2015).
61 Id. at 888.
62 See id. at 899-900.
63 See id. at 880, 889-90.
64 Id. at 880.
65 Id. at 899.
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is tempting to treat their results as evidence that politically motivated
reasoning does not affect judges.
We would understand, however, why a reasonable person might not be
persuaded by this interpretation. By their own account, Wistrich et al.
designed their experiments to test whether “emotions” would motivate judges
in general to “bend[] the law to achieve justice.”66 It is unclear whether
indulging this shared sense of justice actually required much law bending on
the part of the judges in the studies.67 But what is clear is that the Wistrich
et al. experiments simply were not designed in a manner that could have been
expected to generate divergent responses among judges with conflicting
conceptions of justice based on opposing ideologies.
The second study—another well done and important one—was designed
to do exactly that.68 In it, Richard Redding and N. Dickon Reppucci tested
how a sample of judges and law students reacted to social science studies
relating to the deterrent efficacy of the death penalty.69 In both students and
judges, pre-existing opinions and political outlooks were correlated with the
subjects’ decision to afford “dispositive weight” to the studies in determining
the constitutionality of the death penalty. The same factors, however,
influenced only the students’ and not the judges’ assessments of the
admissibility of such evidence in legal proceedings.70
Certain features of the design of the Redding–Reppucci study admittedly
limit the strength of the inferences that can be drawn from it. First, the study
was not suited to assessing motivated reasoning. In examining whether their
subjects were willing to treat the deterrence studies as “dispositive” for their
legal rulings, Redding and Reppucci effectively measured whether their
subjects’ changed their views after being exposed to contrary evidence. The
at 899.
of Wistrich et al.’s results can fairly be read this way but many cannot. In the medicalmarijuana problem, for example, the statute expressly stated that the medical-need affidavit must
indicate that the “the medical use of marijuana” was necessary “to treat or alleviate the person’s
serious or debilitating medical condition or symptoms.” Id. at 914 (emphasis added). The “sympathetic” party’s affidavit in fact described him as suffering from “severe pain caused by bone cancer,”
a “debilitating” condition that “would likely kill him in a year”; the “unsympathetic” defendant’s
affidavit, in contrast, stated that he was “being treated for occasional mild seizures” that were “not
debilitating and might abate within a year.” Id. (emphasis added). In this problem, then, the emotional sensibilities that Wistrich et al. attribute to the judges in the two conditions matched up with
the language of the statute being construed. In the bankruptcy case, too, differing reactions to the
“sympathetic” and “unsympathetic” parties’ reasons for incurring debt were relevant to the credibility
of their respective denials of fraudulent intent, the honesty of which was the only issue for decision.
68 See Richard E. Redding & N. Dickon Reppucci, Effects of Lawyers’ Socio-Political Attitudes on
Their Judgments of Social Science in Legal Decision Making, 23 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 31 (1999).
69 See id. at 34-35.
70 Id. at 48.
66 Id.

67 Some
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subjects’ failure to do so could have reflected motivated reasoning but is in
fact consistent with unbiased information processing as well. For example,
subjects of opposing views could have viewed the deterrence studies as
equivalent in significance to ones they had examined before the study.
Additionally, those with opposing views might have viewed the contrary
evidence as comparably strong but not sufficiently so to outweigh the force
of additional evidence they had evaluated before the study. Ruling out these
competing inferences requires a design that can detect whether subjects are
in fact opportunistically adjusting the assessments they make of one and the
same piece of evidence based on its perceived relationship to their preexisting opinion or their group identities.71
Second, the deterrent efficacy of the death penalty does not uniquely
determine the answer to the legal problem the subjects addressed: Is the death
penalty unconstitutional? That question turns on additional normative
considerations that are likely to be correlated with political outlooks but that
are nevertheless intrinsic to law. A legal decisionmaker could legitimately
rely on such considerations, then, without being engaged in “ideologically
biased” reasoning.72
Nevertheless, the Redding–Reppucci finding that judges of opposing
outlooks did not vary in their rulings on the evidentiary admissibility of the
studies furnishes some reason—contrary to the prevailing scholarly view—to
think that judges will not be influenced by political commitments extrinsic to
the legal issue at hand. That Redding and Reppucci found that the
evidentiary rulings of the law students, in contrast, were so affected
underscores the mistake of assuming that one can generalize from the
vulnerability of non-judges to politically biased reasoning to the vulnerability
of judges to this same impediment to neutral decisionmaking.
But the bottom line can be stated simply: “[T]here is a need for more
targeted and systematic experiments that specifically investigate motivated
cognition in populations of judges” before any firm conclusions can be drawn.73
71 See James N. Druckman, The Politics of Motivation, 24 C RITICAL REV . 199, 203-07 (2012);
Alan Gerber & Donald Green, Misperceptions About Perceptual Bias, 2 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 189,
206 (1999); Kahan, Cognition of Law, supra note 9, at 60.
72 See supra notes 30–35 and accompanying text; cf. Redding & Reppucci, supra note 68, at 48.
This same difficulty—the use of designs that tested the influence of values intrinsic rather than
genuinely extrinsic to the legal problem being addressed—constrains the strength of the inferences
that can be drawn from various other studies involving law students and members of the public. See,
e.g., Braman & Nelson, supra note 6, at 947 (manipulating the authorities in a constitutional law case
pertinent to reconciling tension between anti-discrimination and free speech principles); Nadler &
McDonnell, supra note 49, at 73 (manipulating the moral quality of behavior legally relevant to
assessing issue of “causation”).
73 Sood, supra note 12, at 318.
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II. INFORMATION PROCESSING, PATTERN RECOGNITION
AND PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT
While no study has tested the vulnerability of judges to identityprotective cognition, judges have been the focus of an impressive collection
of studies examining other cognitive dynamics. Rooted in behavioral law and
economics,74 these studies feature mechanisms such as “hindsight bias,”
“anchoring,” “probability neglect,” and the like,75 the effects of which bias
probabilistic reasoning.
These studies suggest that judges enjoy limited but imperfect resistance
to these biases. They thus reinforce the conclusion that the vulnerability of
judges to identity-protective cognition cannot reliably be determined without
the benefit of actual experimental inquiry.
The important forms of experimental inquiry that have actually been
performed on judges, moreover, do not furnish insight into this particular
issue. Behavioral economics examines biases associated with over-reliance on
heuristic information processing, which consists of rapid, unconscious,
affective reactions. Labeled “System 1,” this form of reasoning is an
alternative to “System 2” information processing, which is conscious,
effortful, and analytic, and which is understood to counteract the biases that
the behavioral economics inventory comprises.76
Experimental study of identity-protective cognition, however, shows that
it is not a consequence of over-reliance on heuristic information processing.
On the contrary, multiple studies have found that the individuals most
proficient in and most disposed to resort to System 2 modes of information
processing are even more likely to construe information in a manner that
evinces identity-protective reasoning.77 As a result, individuals who are
revealed by one measure or another to be those least vulnerable to the biases
associated with over-reliance on heuristic, System 1 information processing

74 See generally Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998) (proposing an economic analysis of legal rules
and legal actors based in considerations of actual behavior that include fallacious and directional
decisionmaking).
75 See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How
Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 19-27 (2007) (reviewing studies of judicial
decisionmaking which analyze the influence of anchoring, statistical inferences, and hindsight bias).
76 See generally Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral
Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449 (2003); Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, A Model of
Heuristic Judgment, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THINKING AND REASONING 267, 26768 (2005).
77 See Kahan, supra note 16, at 416; Kahan, Peters, Wittlin, Slovic, Ouellette, Braman &
Mandel, supra note 16.
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are in fact the most politically polarized on contested issues like climate
change, gun control, nuclear power, fracking, and the like.78
Legal training and practice can reasonably be understood to cultivate
proficiency in conscious, analytical forms of reasoning. Thus, the work on
“motivated System 2 reasoning”—that portion of the literature that examines
the tendency of conscious, effortful information processing to magnify
identity-protective cognition79—might in fact be regarded as furnishing
strong support for the conjecture that unconscious cultural partisanship can
be expected to subvert judicial neutrality.80
Nevertheless, when judges decide cases, they are not merely engaging in
conscious, effortful information processing. They are exercising professional
judgment. Professional judgment consists of habits of mind—conscious and
effortful to some degree, but just as much tacit and perceptive—that are
distinctively fitted to reasoning tasks that fall outside ordinary experience.81
Indeed, it is characterized in many fields by resistance to all manner of error,
including ones founded on heuristic information processing that would defeat
the special form of decision that professional judgment facilitates.82
The dominant scholarly account of professional judgment roots it in the
dynamic of pattern recognition.83 Pattern recognition consists of the rapid unor pre-conscious matching of phenomena with mentally inventoried
prototypes. A ubiquitous form of information processing, pattern recognition
is the type of cognition that enables human beings to recognize faces and read
one another’s’ emotions.84 But it is also the basis for many forms of highly
78 See Dan M. Kahan, What is the “science of science communication”?, J. SCI . C OMM . (Aug. 25,
2015), http://jcom.sissa.it/archive/14/03/JCOM_1403_2015_Y04 [http://perma.cc/NL8M -U8MM].
79 See Dan M. Kahan, Ellen Peters, Erika Cantrell Dawson & Paul Slovic, Motivated Numeracy
and Enlightened Self-Government 25 (Cultural Cognition Project, Working Paper No. 116, 2013),
http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/386437/23982003/1385735927633/
wp_draft_1.5_9_14_13.pdf?token=k3oG7Vfla1yerw5DPKyLzu6KN2A%3D [http://perma.cc/Q9UDCVWG]; supra note 16.
80 In fact, evidence suggests that judges score higher than average on the Cognitive Reflection
Test (CRT), see Shane Frederick, Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall
2005, at 25, which is the standard measure of the capacity and disposition to use System 2 reasoning.
Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich report that a large sample of state court judges (N = 250) attained
a mean CRT score of 1.23. Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 75, at 14. The mean score in
a general population sample is approximately 0.65. The score of the judges in the conference would
place them between the 75th and 90th percentile for the general population. Kahan, supra note 77,
at 410.
81 See MARGOLIS , supra note 15, at 35.
82 See id.
83 See generally HOWARD M ARGOLIS , P ATTERNS , T HINKING , AND C OGNITION : A
THEORY OF JUDGMENT (1987).
84 See P AUL M. C HURCHLAND, THE E NGINE OF REASON , THE SEAT OF THE S OUL : A
PHILOSOPHICAL JOURNEY INTO THE BRAIN 27-42, 123-32 (1995).
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specialized forms of expert decisionmaking.85 Highly proficient chess players,
for example, outperform others not by anticipating and consciously
simulating a longer sequence of potential moves, but by more reliably
perceiving the prototypical affinity of different board positions to ones that
thousands of hours of experience have taught them confer an advantage.86
Likewise, the proficiency of aerial photography analysts consists in their tacit
ability to discern prototypical clusters of subtle cues that allow them to cull
from large masses of scanned images ones that profitably merit more finegrained analysis.87 Forensic accountants must use the same form of facility as
they comb through mountains of records in search of financial irregularities
or fraud.88
Expert medical judgment supplies an especially compelling and
instructive example of the role of pattern recognition. Without question,
competent medical diagnosis depends on the capacity to draw valid inferences
from myriad sources of evidence that reflect the correlation between
particular symptoms and various pathologies—a form critical reasoning that
figures in System 2 information processing. But studies have shown that an
appropriately attuned capacity for pattern recognition plays an indispensable
role in expert medical diagnosis, for unless a physician is able to form an
initial set of plausible conjectures—based on the match between a patient’s
symptoms and an appropriately stocked inventory of disease prototypes—the
probability that the physician will even know to collect the evidence that
enables a proper diagnosis will be unacceptably low.89
85 See Erik Dane & Michael G. Pratt, Exploring Intuition and Its Role in Managerial Decision
Making, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 33, 42-43 (2007).
86 See Herbert A. Simon & William G. Chase, Skill in Chess: Experiments with Chess-Playing
Tasks and Computer Simulation of Skilled Performance Throw Light on Some Human Perceptual and
Memory Processes, 61 AM. SCIENTIST 394, 402 (1973).
87 See E LEANOR J. G IBSON , P RINCIPLES OF P ERCEPTUAL LEARNING AND
DEVELOPMENT 8 (1969).
88 See, e.g., Jean C. Bedard & Stanley F. Biggs, Pattern Recognition, Hypotheses Generation, and
Auditor Performance in an Analytical Task, 66 ACCT. REV. 622, 624 (1991).
89 See generally James A. Marcum, An Integrated Model of Clinical Reasoning: Dual-Process Theory
of Cognition and Metacognition, 18 J. EVALUATION CLINICAL PRAC. 954 (2012) (proposing a model
of reasoning by treating physicians which relies on initial pattern recognition); Geoff Norman,
Meredith Young & Lee Brooks, Non-Analytical Models of Clinical Reasoning: The Role of Experience,
41 MED. EDUC. 1140 (2007) (demonstrating experimentally that expert medical diagnosis relies on
initial recognition of significant patterns); Vimla L. Patel, David R. Kaufman & Jose F. Arocha,
Emerging Paradigms of Cognition in Medical Decisionmaking, J. BIOMEDICAL INFORMATICS, Feb.
2002, at 52 (suggesting additional research into intuitive, non-analytical components of medical
diagnostic decisionmaking); Vimla L. Patel & Guy J. Groen, Knowledge Based Solution Strategies in
Medical Reasoning, 10 COGNITIVE SCI. 91 (1986) (reporting that accurate diagnoses in an empirical
study were reached by physicians who relied on an initial experiential knowledge base before
immediately resorting to hypothesis testing).
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The proposition that pattern recognition plays this role in professional
judgment is most famously associated with Howard Margolis.90 Focusing on
expert assessment of risk,91 Margolis described a form of information
processing that differs markedly from the standard System 1/System 2
conception of dual-process reasoning. The latter attributes proficient risk
assessment to an individual’s capacity and disposition to “override” his or her
unconscious System 1 affective reactions with ones that reflect effortful
System 2 assessments of evidence.92
Margolis, in contrast, suggests an integrated and reciprocal relationship
between unconscious, perceptive forms of cognition, on the one hand, and
conscious, analytical ones, on the other. Much as in the case of proficient
medical diagnosis, expert risk assessment demands reliable, preconscious
apprehension of the phenomena that merit valid analytical processing. Even
then, the effective use of data generated by such means, Margolis maintains,
will depend on the risk expert’s reliable assimilation of such evidence to an
inventory of patterns that consists in prototypical representations of cases
that give proper effect to data of that sort. Of course, the quality of an expert’s
pattern recognition capacity will depend heavily on his or her proficiency in
conscious, analytical reasoning. That form of information processing,
employed to assess and re-assess successes and failures over the course of the
expert’s training and experience, is what calibrates the expert’s perceptive faculty.
To translate Margolis’s account back into the dominant conception of
dual-process reasoning, System 2 gets nowhere—because it is not reliably
activated—without a discerning System 1 faculty of perception. The
reliability of System 1, however, in turn presupposes the contribution System
2 makes to the process of continual self-evaluation necessary to calibrate
perceptive judgment.93

MARGOLIS, supra note 15; MARGOLIS, supra note 83.
See MARGOLIS, supra note 15.
92 See Kahneman, supra note 76, at 1450-54; Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 76, at 273.
93 See M ARGOLIS , supra note 15, at 49-70; see also M ARGOLIS , supra note 83, at 63-86.
Margolis’s account is not so much an alternative to as an alternative conception of dual process
reasoning. Again, whereas Kahneman tends to conceptualize “System 1” and “System 2” in discrete,
hierarchical terms, Kahneman, supra note 76, at 1451, Margolis’s conception sees pre- or unconscious
forms of information processing and conscious, effortful forms as integrated and reciprocal. There
are other dual-process theorists who offer integrated, reciprocal accounts as well. See, e.g., KEITH
E. STANOVICH, RATIONALITY AND THE REFLECTIVE MIND 139-54 (2011); Valerie F. Reyna,
How People Make Decisions That Involve Risk: a Dual-Processes Approach, 13 CURRENT DIRECTIONS
IN PSYCHOL. SCI . 60 (2004). The work of Peters and her collaborators on numeracy, in particular,
suggests a reciprocal, integrated conception of dual-process reasoning insofar as higher numeracy is
associated with—because presumably it is activated by—more precise affective discernment of
advantageous decisionmaking opportunities. See Ellen Peters, Daniel Västfjäll, Paul Slovic, C. K.
90
91
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Karl Llewellyn suggested an account of the reasoning style of lawyers and
judges very much akin to Margolis’s view of professional judgment. Although
Llewellyn is often identified as emphasizing the indeterminacy of formal legal
rules and doctrines, the aim of his most important works was to explain how
there could be such a tremendously high degree of consensus among lawyers
and judges on what those rules and doctrines entail.94 His answer was
“situation sense”: a perceptive faculty, formed through professional training
and experience, that enables lawyers and judges to reliably assimilate
controversies to “situation-types” that indicate their proper resolutions.95
Llewellyn discounted the emphasis on deductive logic featured in legal
argumentation. But he did not dismiss such reasoning as mere confabulation:
in his view, lawyers and judges (legislators, too, in drafting rules) employed
formal reasoning to prime or activate the “situation sense” of other lawyers
and judges.96 This is the same function that Margolis describes ratiocination
Mertz, Ketti Mazzocco & Stephan Dickert, Numeracy and Decision Making, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 407
(2006).
94 See KARL L LEWELLYN , T HE C ASE L AW SYSTEM IN AMERICA 73-77, (Paul Gewirtz ed.,
Michael Ansaldi trans., 1989):
The words “legal certainty” seem to evoke in most lawyers’ minds an image of simply
being able to apply an existing rule of law deductively. We are used to thinking like
this, particularly since judicial opinions and legal discourse must always be dressed up
this way so as to be socially acceptable. My claim would be, though, that for the cases
which occasion difficulties, this kind of legal certainty never has existed and never will
exist. . . .
[Yet] [i]n spite of all this, the outcome of a dispute concerning the law is predictable to a truly amazing degree, and for that reason the law is (descriptively) certain.
95 See KARL N. LLEWELLYN , T HE C OMMON LAW T RADITION : D ECIDING APPEALS 5961, 121-57, 206-08 (1960) (examining a variety of cases through the “situation-sense” framework).
96 See id. at 183-91 (describing rules as forms of “singing reason” that reliably summon situation
types); Karl N. Llewellyn, On Reading and Using the Newer Jurisprudence, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 581,
590 (1940) (examining cases to reveal that the successful appellant did not identify logical constraints
on judges’ reasoning but “‘simply’ got the court to ‘see’ ‘the true’ rule and its bearing”). Some
observational study proponents of the “ideology thesis”—the view that ideological predispositions
shape judging independently of legal reasoning, see Edwards & Livermore, supra note 11, at 1945—
characterize their outlook as the “New Legal Realism,” and claim they are refining and sharpening
Llewellyn’s views of judicial decisionmaking. See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 41, at 831; see also
EPSTEIN, POSNER & LANDES, supra note 5, at 25-63 (characterizing the use of ideological variables
in multivariate regression models to constitute a “realistic theory of judicial behavior” and
castigating so-called “legalists” and “anti-realists” critics of such an approach). Legal Realism, of
course, comprised a diverse set of thinkers whose various theories of adjudication varied in their
systematization and ultimately were only loosely related. But the equation of Llewellyn’s position,
in particular, with the view that judges are motivated, consciously or unconsciously, by “political”
sensibilities seems out of keeping with how Llewellyn himself understood his own work. To be sure,
Llewellyn rejected the proposition that legal reasoning can be faithfully represented as the deductive
application of formal rules. Nevertheless, he vehemently insisted—in opposition, in fact, to the
views of certain other Legal Realists, most notably Jerome Frank, see Llewellyn, supra note 96, at
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playing in professional discourse among risk experts97 and indeed in any
setting in which human beings resort to it.98
Margolis also identified the role that pattern recognition plays in
professional judgment to explain expert–public conflicts over risk. Lacking
the experience and training of experts, and hence the stock of prototypes that
reliably guide expert risk assessment, members of the public, Margolis
argued, were prone to one or another heuristic bias. By the same token, the
experts’ access to those prototypes reliably fixes their attention on the
pertinent features of risks that excite cognitive biases on the part of the lay
public.99
Based on the role of pattern recognition in professional judgment, one
might make an analogous claim about judicial and lay judgments in culturally
contested legal disputes. On this account, lawyers’ and judges’ “situation
sense” can be expected to reliably fix their attention on pertinent elements of
case “situation types,” thereby immunizing them from the distorting influence
that identity-protective cognition exerts on the judgments of legally
untrained members of the public. It is thus possible that the professional
judgment of the judge, as an expert neutral decisionmaker, embodies exactly the
form of information processing most likely to counteract identity-protective
reasoning, including the elements of it magnified by System 2 reasoning.
III. STUDY DESIGN AND HYPOTHESES
We performed a study to examine the impact of ideology on judicial
reasoning. The study was self-consciously designed to remedy the defects in
existing observational and experimental studies, and to test plausible
competing hypotheses about the relationship of identity-protective cognition
to lawyers’ and judges’ professional judgment.
A. Design
1. Overview
Making valid inferences about how the professional judgment of lawyers
and judges interacts with identity-protective cognition requires comparing

593, 598-601—that judges can be expected to converge in their rulings based on a shared
apprehension of the pertinent features of recurring “situation types.” See id. at 589-91.
97 See MARGOLIS , supra note 81, at 67.
98 See id. at 49-63; M ARGOLIS , supra note 83, at 87-111.
99 See MARGOLIS , supra note 81, at 35-36, 67-68, 94-95.
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how lawyers and non-lawyers reason with regard to both legal and nonlegal
decisionmaking tasks. That is what our study did.
2. Sample
Overall, there were 1554 subjects. Eight hundred of them consisted of
adult members of the U.S. general public. Recruited and stratified for
national representativeness,100 the sample was 49% male, and 76% of its
members were white, 11% African-American, and 12% Hispanic. The average
age was 52. The median educational attainment was “some college,” and the
median income was $40,000 to $49,000.
Two hundred and fifty-three judges participated in the study.
Approximately 200 responded to solicitations issued to judicial conference
attendees.101 The remainder were recruited from participants in two online
CLE lectures.102 All were state judges and consisted of a mix of roughly equal
numbers of trial and appellate court members.
The sample also included 225 lawyers and 250 law students. The former
were recruited via solicitations to attorneys in Connecticut, Illinois, New
York, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia and Washington, D.C. Law student
subjects were recruited from Harvard Law School, the Temple University
Beasley School of Law, William & Mary Law School, and Yale Law School.
The law students were a mix of first-, second-, and third-year students, but
those who had not yet completed at least one semester were excluded.
In all cases, the solicitation indicated that the study was designed to
enable study of legal and related forms of reasoning in members of the public,
law students, lawyers, and judges. Beyond that, no information was supplied
on the nature of the study.

100 The general public sample was recruited by the public opinion research firm YouGov, which
conducts online surveys and experiments on behalf of academic and governmental researchers and
commercial customers (including political campaigns). The firm’s general population recruitment
and stratification methods have been validated in studies comparing the results of YouGov surveys
with those conducted for American National Election Studies. See Stephen Ansolabehere & Douglas
Rivers, Cooperative Survey Research, 16 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 307, 320 (2013).
101 The conferences included the 2014 Annual Conference of the Council of Chief Judges of
State Courts of Appeals; the 2014 Annual Education Program of the Florida Conference of District
Court of Appeal Judges; the 2013 Annual Judicial Education Conference of the Texas Center for
the Judiciary; and the September 2013 Advanced Science and Technology Adjudication Resource
(ASTAR) Center meeting (a seminar for judges on issues in forensic proof).
102 The lectures, for which notices were issued by the National Center for State Courts and the
National Judicial College, were furnished to enable judges to satisfy continuing legal education.
Study solicitations were sent to participating judges, whose participation was of course optional.
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3. Cultural Worldview Measures
All subjects’ “cultural outlooks” were measured with abbreviated versions
of the Cultural Cognition Worldview Scales (CCWS).103 The CCWS
characterize respondents’ worldviews, or preferences for how society or other
collective enterprises should be organized, along two orthogonal dimensions
(Figure 1).104 One of these, “hierarchy–egalitarianism,” assesses how much
subjects support or oppose modes of organization that tie authority to clearly
delineated social roles and characteristics versus ones that view such roles and
characteristics as illegitimate bases for the distribution of power and
resources. The other, “individualism–communitarianism,” assesses the
degree to which respondents prefer modes of organization that treat
individuals as responsible for securing the conditions of their own flourishing
free of collective assistance or interference versus ones that treat securing
individual wellbeing as a collective responsibility that takes precedence over
individual interests.105
The CCWS measures have been featured in numerous studies involving
identity-protective cognition.106 They are best conceived of, in our view, as
merely one of many potential candidate “latent variable” measures of groupbased dispositions or outlooks that might be hypothesized to generate
identity-protective cognition or like dynamics. Right–left political outlooks
are another; CCWS measures are modestly correlated with such outlooks but
have been shown to be more discerning of variance across a wide range of

103 See Cultural Cognition Worldview Scales (CCWS)—Long & Short Forms, DECISION M AKING
INDIVIDUAL
DIFFERENCES
INVENTORY,
http://www.sjdm.org/dmidi/Cultural
_Cognition_Worldview_Scales.html [http://perma.cc/624M-D7LB] (last visited Oct. 31, 2015).
104 This scheme is itself intended to operationalize the “cultural theory of risk” associated with
Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky. See MARY DOUGLAS & AARON B. WILDAVSKY, RISK AND
CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE SELECTION OF TECHNICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS
(1982) see also Steve Rayner, Cultural Theory and Risk Analysis (using grid or group analysis to predict
and understand individual preferences), in SOCIAL THEORIES OF RISK 83, 87-91 (Sheldon
Krimsky & Dominic Golding eds., 1992).
105 Dan M. Kahan, Cultural Cognition as a Conception of the Cultural Theory of Risk, in
HANDBOOK OF RISK THEORY: E PISTEMOLOGY, DECISION THEORY, ETHICS AND SOCIAL
IMPLICATIONS OF RISK 725, 730-35 (R. Hillerbrand et al. eds., 2012).
106 See generally Kahan, supra note 13 (providing examples of studies that have used CCWS
measures to analyze respondents' perceptions of various social issues, including environmental
problems, nanotechnology, and human-papillomavirus (HPV) vaccinations for schoolgirls).
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contested policy,107 risk,108 and legal issues. 109 They also have been shown to
display psychometric properties superior to other latent-disposition scales
commonly used to study public risk perceptions.110
Figure 1: Cultural Cognition of Risk

Note: “Cultural cognition of risk” refers to the tendency of individuals to form perceptions of risk that reflect and
reinforce their commitments to affinity groups whose members share values that can be characterized along two
orthogonal dimensions: “hierarchy–egalitarianism” and “individualism–communitarianism.”111

The conventional short-form version of the CCWS instrument includes
twelve items, six each for the “individualism–communitarianism” and
107 See John Gastil, Don Braman, Dan Kahan & Paul Slovic, The Cultural Orientation of Mass
Political Opinion, 44 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 711 (2011) (concluding that cultural worldview scales
display more variance among respondents and are less sensitive to differences in political
sophistication on policy issues such as gun control, universal health care, elimination of estate taxes,
and restricting carbon emissions).
108 See Kahan, Peters, Wittlin, Slovic, Ouellette, Braman & Mandel supra note 16, at 732-35
(describing a study finding that cultural worldviews have greater explanatory power than political
measures for climate change and nuclear power risk perceptions).
109 See Kahan, Hoffman, Braman, Evans & Rachlinski, supra note 46, at 884 n.118 (finding that
cultural worldviews are more discerning of biased perceptions of fact in legal controversy).
110 See Wen Xue, Donald W. Hine, Natasha M. Loi, Einar B. Thorsteinsson, & Wendy J.
Phillips, Cultural Worldviews and Environmental Risk Perceptions: A Meta-Analysis, J. ENVTL.
PSYCHOL., Dec. 2014, at 249, 257.
111 See id.; Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L.
& POL’Y REV. 149, 151-57 (2006).

378

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 164: 349

“hierarchy–egalitarianism” worldview dimensions. In this study, an
abbreviated version of CCWS consisting of only four items—two per
dimension—was employed:
CHARM. Sometimes government needs to make laws that keep people from
hurting themselves.
IPRIVACY. The government should stop telling people how to live their
lives.
HEQUAL. We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country.
EWEALTH. Our society would be better off if the distribution of wealth
was more equal.

Subjects responded to each item by indicating their level of agreement on
six-point scale (“strongly disagree,” “moderately disagree,” “slightly
disagree,” “slightly agree,” “moderately agree,” “strongly agree”).
The decision to administer only four items in this study was made to
minimize the probability of noncompletion by judges, who it was anticipated
might be reluctant to respond to a high number of items assessing their
values. It was anticipated that scales constructed from even these four items,
however, would display acceptable psychometric properties insofar as the
items in question had been shown in previous studies to have the highest
correlation with the latent construct or disposition associated with the
respective scales from which they were drawn.
Factor analysis—which assesses the covariance patterns of prospective
indicators of a latent variable measure—confirmed that variance in the
subjects’ responses to the four items was best explained by two separate
orthogonal factors, each of which loaded on (or were correlated with) the
appropriate pairs of items. Scales formed with the two pairs of items reflected
acceptable levels of measurement precision: in the case of hierarchy–
egalitarianism, Cronbach’s α = 0.73; in the case of individualism–
communitarianism, α = 0.64.
Factor scores, which weight items in proportion to their correlation with
the underlying latent construct, were used as measures of the subjects’
“hierarchy–egalitarian” and “individualism–communitarian” worldviews.112
Standardized with means at 0, the measures were valenced so that positive
scores denoted either a relatively hierarchical or a relatively individualistic
disposition and negative scores either a relatively egalitarian or
communitarian disposition on the indicated scale.
112 See generally ROBERT F. D E V ELLIS , SCALE D EVELOPMENT: T HEORY AND
APPLICATIONS 103-37 (2d ed. 2002).
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The cultural worldview items were administered to subjects after their
completion of the legal problem and risk-perception tasks featured in the
study. This particular decision was made to avoid the risk that exposure to
those items would independently arouse identity-protective motivations that
might affect subjects’ analyses of the statutory interpretation problems.
Figure 2: Cultural Worldview Distributions
lawyer
student

lawyer
judge
student

public

judge

-3
-2
-1
Egalitarianism

public

0

1

2
3
Hierarchy

-3
-2
-1
Communitarianism

0

1

2
3
Individualism

Note: Distributions of subject types’ worldviews. Scores are standardized: 0 is the sample mean, and
units are standard deviations from the mean. Subject type explained 7% of the variance in the
hierarchy–egalitarianism scale and 9% of the variance in the individualism–communitarianism scale.

Examination of responses to the worldview items suggested that variation
between subject types was modest. Members of the general public sample
were more hierarchical (M = 0.24, SEM = 0.04) and individualistic
(M = 0.27, SEM = 0.03) than the other subject types. Judges were close to
average in their hierarchy–egalitarian scores (M = -0.01, SEM = 0.06), while
students (M = -0.38, SEM = 0.05) and lawyers (M = -0.37, SEM = 0.05) were
modestly egalitarian. The students were close to average in their
individualism–communitarianism scores (M = -0.15, SEM = 0.06), while the
judges (M = -0.36, SEM = 0.06) and lawyers were modestly communitarian
(M = -0.43, SEM = 0.06). As illustrated in Figure 2, differences between the
outlooks of different subject types were relatively minor in comparison to the
variation within the sample as a whole.
The hierarchy–egalitarian and individualism–communitarian scales so
formed are treated as continuous measures for purposes of testing the study
hypotheses. For expositional convenience, however, we will frequently refer
to subjects as either “Hierarchical Individualists,” “Hierarchical Communitarians,”
“Egalitarian Individualists,” or “Egalitarian Communitarians.” When used in
connection with summary or descriptive analyses, these labels will be applied
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based on subjects’ scores in relation to the means on the two scales. In
multivariate testing, the labels will be used to refer to subjects modeled as
possessing combinations of worldview scores either one standard deviation
above (for “Hierarchical-” and “-Individualist”) or one standard deviation
below the scale means (for “Egalitarian-” and “-Communitarian”).
4. Statutory Interpretation Problems
Subjects were instructed to imagine they were judges and indicate how
they would rule in two cases. Each case featured a statutory ambiguity of the
sort familiar to lawyers and judges.113 Resolving the ambiguity was necessary
to decide whether the statute, properly construed, applied to the behavior of
a defendant or group of defendants in a government enforcement proceeding
(civil in one case, criminal in the other).
Each problem also involved an experimental manipulation: the identity
of a party involved in the case was varied in a manner that had no analytical
bearing on how the statutory ambiguity should be resolved but that was
expected nevertheless to imbue the outcome with a cultural meaning or
resonance that would generate identity-protective reasoning. Any tendency
on the part of culturally diverse decisionmakers to adjust their interpretations
to support the outcomes most congenial to their group commitments would
thus supply unambiguous evidence of the susceptibility of their reasoning to
values extrinsic to law.114
a. Littering
The first case, “Littering,” involved a statutory provision forbidding
“littering, disposing, or depositing any form of garbage, refuse, junk, or other
debris” on the grounds of any national wildlife preserve.115 The defendants
had admittedly left unattended in such a preserve—a portion of desert along
the United States–Mexico border—400 ten-gallon reusable plastic water
dispensers, which they intended to be used and periodically refilled. The
subjects were instructed to play the role of a trial court judge ruling on a
motion to dismiss a civil penalty action against the defendants. As spelled out
clearly in the case vignette, proper disposition of the motion turned on whether
the defendants’ conduct could be deemed “depositing . . . junk” or “debris.”

113 The statutory interpretation problems and other components of the study instrument appear
in Appendix B.
114 See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
115 Cf. Disposal of Waste, 50 C.F.R. § 27.94(a) (2014) (containing slightly different language).
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The experimental manipulation related to the identity of the defendants.
For half of the subjects, the defendants were identified as immigrant aid
workers, who anticipated that the water would be consumed by aliens crossing
the desert to enter the United States illegally (“immigrant aid version”). For
the other half, the defendants were identified as construction workers, who
intended to drink the water from the containers themselves while working on
a border fence designed to prevent illegal entry into the United States
(“construction workers version”).
The party-identity manipulation in Littering does not, in our professional
judgment as a group of lawyers and one judge, have any bearing on how the
statutory ambiguity should be resolved as a matter of law. Nevertheless, we
anticipated the manipulation would trigger opposing identity-protective
motivations among subjects of relatively hierarchic–individualistic outlooks,
on the one hand, and subjects of relatively egalitarian–communitarian ones,
on the other.
Hierarchical individualists expect authority and status to be distributed
on the basis of conspicuous, largely stable social roles and resent collective
interference with the individual prerogatives that attend those roles.
Egalitarian communitarians, in contrast, resent social orderings that feature
sharp rankings in power and entitlements and treat securing conditions of
individual flourishing as a collective responsibility that trumps individual
entitlements.116
It seems reasonable to expect that individuals with these outlooks would
tend to disagree about how readily to accept immigration into the United
States, or to excuse illegal entry by aliens seeking to escape from social
deprivation elsewhere. Indeed, consistent with the dynamic of cultural
cognition, they tend to form opposing perceptions of the risk that illegal
immigration poses to societal wellbeing in the United States.117
The party-identity manipulation in Littering was designed to affect the
motivating stake of Egalitarian Communitarians and Hierarchical
Individualists by altering the social meaning of a judgment against the
defendants. A legal determination that the defendant immigrant-aid group
was “depositing junk” or “debris” in the desert by leaving refillable water
containers there for use by prospective illegal immigrants would be identityaffirming for Hierarchical Individualists, but identity-threatening or
identity-denigrating for Egalitarian Communitarians. One would thus
Rayner, supra note 104; Kahan & Braman, supra note 111.
See Dan Kahan, U.S. Risk-Perception/Polarization Snapshot, CULTURAL COGNITION
PROJECT AT YALE L. SCH. (Dec. 30, 2011, 10:00 AM), http://www.culturalcognition.net
/blog/2011/12/30/us-risk-perceptionpolarization-snapshot.html [http://perma.cc/565X-P86V].
116
117
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expect, if identity-protective cognition shaped assessments of the case, that
Hierarchical Individualists would be substantially more inclined to find a
violation than Egalitarian Communitarians in the “immigrant aid version” of
the problem.
The social-meaning valence of the case, and the corresponding
unconscious motivations, would be flipped around, in contrast, in the
“construction worker” version. There it would be Hierarchical Individualists
whose identities would be denigrated and Egalitarian Communitarians whose
identities would be affirmed by a ruling that workers building an exclusionary
fence were polluting the desert. One would thus expect Egalitarian
Communitarians to be more inclined to find a violation than Hierarchical
Individualists in that version of the problem.
b. Disclosure
The second case, “Disclosure,” involved a familiar “mistake of law” issue.
The statute in Disclosure made it a crime for a government official to
“knowingly violate” a prohibition on “disclosing” to the public “confidential
investigatory information relating to an identifiable private citizen.” The
defendant, a police officer, admittedly disclosed to a private party what the
officer knew to be “confidential investigatory information.” Nevertheless, he
claimed not to “know” that he was “violat[ing]” any statutory prohibition.
His ignorance of the prohibition, the vignette made clear, would not furnish
the officer a defense if the term “knowingly” was construed to relate only to
the confidential nature of the information, to its release, and to the status of
the information recipient as a member of the public rather than another
government official; if, in contrast, “knowingly” were construed to relate in
addition to the existence of the prohibition on disclosing such information,
then the defendant officer’s ignorance would be a defense.118 The subjects
were instructed to evaluate these alternative readings of the statute for the
purpose of ruling on the defendant’s appeal of the trial court’s refusal to
instruct the jury that unawareness of the legal prohibition on disclosure would
in fact defeat proof of a crime.
The experimental manipulation in this case concerned the identity of the
party to whom the defendant had made the disclosure. In the “pro-choice
118 Compare United States v. Int’l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563 (1971) (holding
that the term “knowingly” applies only to the defendant’s mental state regarding her conduct, not
to her mental state regarding the regulation’s existence), with Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S.
419, 432 (1985) (holding that “in a prosecution for violation of [7 U.S.C.] § 2024(b)(1) [(1982)] the
Government must prove that the defendant knew that his acquisition or possession of food stamps
was in a manner unauthorized by statute or regulations”).
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center” version of the problem, subjects were advised that the officer had
leaked the investigatory information to “a noncommercial ‘family planning’
center that provides free information on birth control and abortion services”; the
information supplied by the defendant police officer was that an individual
known to police to belong to an anti-abortion group had applied to the center
for employment under false pretenses. In the “pro-life center” version of the
problem, study subjects were advised that the information recipient was a
“religious ‘family planning’ center that counsels women on alternatives to
abortion”; the information was that an individual known to police to belong
to a pro-choice group had applied to the center for employment without
disclosing this part of his background.
Of no consequence to the “mistake of law” issue in the case, the
manipulation of the information-recipient’s identity in Disclosure was
expected to provoke identity-protective cognition in individuals who are
either relatively hierarchical and communitarian, on the one hand, or
relatively egalitarian and individualistic, on the other. The former adhere to
social norms that assign individuals role-based obligations (e.g., “mother” or
“religious adherent”) to contribute to the wellbeing of one or another
collective entity (e.g., “family,” or “church”) that is itself rich with statusdefined obligations. The latter, in contrast, chafe at distinctions in status and
authority that do not originate in voluntarily assumed private agreements,
and reject, too, the idea that individuals have unchosen obligations to
subordinate their own well-being to the interests of any collective entity.
The legal right to abortion is an issue that tends to divide Hierarchical
Communitarians and Egalitarian Individualists (particularly female ones119).
The former see abortion “at will” as devaluing the social status of women who
successfully occupy matriarchal roles; the latter view legal protection of the
“right to choose” as a token of society’s commitment to assuring that
individual women, just like individual men, should be afforded esteem for
mastering market and professional roles.120 Again, in line with cultural
cognition, people with these outlooks tend to credit or dismiss asserted
abortion procedure health risks in patterns reflecting the opposing cultural
meanings that such individuals attach to abortion rights.121
The identity-manipulation in Disclosure was aimed at varying the
identity-protective stake that individuals with these cultural worldviews

See generally KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984).
Id. at 158-92 (discussing the different worldviews of pro-choice and pro-life individuals).
121 See Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman, John Gastil, Paul Slovic & C. K. Mertz, Culture and
Identity-Protective Cognition: Explaining the White-Male Effect in Risk Perception, 4 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 465, 489-491 (2007).
119
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would form in the outcome of the Disclosure case. In the “pro-life version”
of the problem, Hierarchical Communitarians, we surmised, would
experience an unconscious motivation to extend a defense to the police
officer: such an outcome, we reasoned, would affirm their worldview by
exonerating from criminal censure a state official who acted to protect a prolife family counseling center from subversion. Precisely because it treats such
an actor as unworthy of legal denunciation, Egalitarian Individualists, we
predicted, would be motivated to deny the officer the defense in that version
of the problem. These positions would be reversed in the “pro-choice
version”: legally condemning the officer for tipping off the pro-choice familycounseling center would be identity-affirming for Egalitarian Individualists,
we surmised, and identity-denigrating for Hierarchical Communitarians.122
5. Risk Perception Measures
In addition to the statutory interpretation problems, the study included a
risk-perception battery. This portion of the study directed subjects to rank
on an eight-point scale the seriousness of the risk “pose[d] to human health,
safety, or prosperity” by a given technology, behavior, or state of affairs.
Variance in responses to this form of risk-perception measure has been shown
to be strongly correlated with variance in more fine-grained factual beliefs
(e.g., in the case of “climate change,” whether human activity is causing global
warming;123 or in the case of “private gun possession,” whether allowing
concealed carrying of firearms in public has an impact on crime rates124).
The risk measures were combined to form two scales. One—consisting of
aggregated responses to items relating to global warming, nuclear power, air
pollution, and water pollution—measured environmental risk perceptions
(α = 0.80). The other, consisting of aggregated responses to items relating to
the legalization of marijuana, teenage pregnancy, domestic terrorism, and
illegal drug trafficking measured social-deviance risk perceptions (α = 0.65).

122 Cf. Kahan, Hoffman, Braman, Evans & Rachlinski, supra note 46 (finding that Hierarchical
Communitarians and Egalitarian Individualists polarized on perception of facts after watching a
video of a protest described as either an anti-abortion demonstration or demonstration protesting
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation).
123 See Dan M. Kahan, Climate-Science Communication and the Measurement Problem, 36
ADVANCES IN P OL. PSYCHOL. 1, 8-9 (2015) (finding that risk perception of climate change is
correlated with the belief that human activity is its cause).
124 See Yoav Ganzach, Shmuel Ellis, Asya Pazy & Tali Ricci-Siag, On the Perception and
Operationalization of Risk Perception, 3 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 317 (2008); Elke U.
Weber, Ann-Renée Blais & Nancy E. Betz, A Domain-Specific Risk-Attitude Scale: Measuring Risk
Perceptions and Risk Behaviors, 15 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 263 (2002).
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Items included in the risk perception battery were selected on the basis of
previous studies that had established them to be ones that trigger identityprotective cognition in relation to the identities associated with the cultural
cognition worldview scales. We thus anticipated that the environmental risk
perception scale would divide subjects inclined toward an egalitarian–
communitarian worldview from ones inclined toward a hierarchical–
individualistic one. We expected the social-deviancy risk scale to divide
subjects inclined toward egalitarian-individualist and hierarchicalcommunitarian worldviews, respectively.125
B. Hypotheses
1. Four Contenders
As indicated, the rationale for the design of the statutory interpretation
problems and the selection of risk-battery items was the expected impact they
would have in triggering identity-protective cognition. The central aim of
the study, however, was to test whether professional judgment of the sort
generally exercised by judges and lawyers would counteract this species of
motivated reasoning. Specifically, the array of problems, combined with the
mix of different types of study subjects, was geared to assessing the relative
plausibility of four distinct hypotheses.
a. Universal Vulnerability
One of the hypotheses was that the status of the subject—member of the
public, law student, lawyer, or judge—would make no difference. All of them
would display the same vulnerability to identity-protective reasoning in both
the legal-problem and risk-perception response measures. We will call this
the Universal Vulnerability (UV) hypothesis. Results consistent with UV
would vindicate the dominant scholarly view that judges are indeed
“ideologically biased”—or “politicians in robes.”
Indeed, corroboration of UV would help to reinforce the two main pillars
of research now thought to support the view that judicial decisionmaking is
“ideological.” Such results would constitute more persuasive grounds for
crediting the view that judges are politically biased than existing identityprotective cognition studies, which, as indicated, attribute to judges
decisionmaking biases observed in general population samples. Findings
125 See generally Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition of Public Policy, 24 YALE
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 147, (2006); Aaron Wildavsky & Karl Dake, Theories of Risk Perception: Who
Fears What and Why?, DAEDALUS, Fall 1990, at 41, 44.

386

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 164: 349

consistent with UV would also help to quiet concerns about the
methodological soundness of observational studies supporting the “ideology
thesis.” A finding that members of the study’s judicial sample were as prone
to identity-protective cognition as members of the general-public sample
would not only be free of the distorting selection bias associated with the
Priest–Klein effect.126 It would also furnish proof of ideological bias undiluted
by the failure of observational studies to distinguish the licit contribution of
values intrinsic to valid legal reasoning from the illicit contribution of values
extrinsic to valid legal reasoning.127
b. Identity-Protective Cognition Immunity
Another hypothesis, which we call “identity-protective cognition
immunity” (ICI), stands UV on its head. ICI posits that the form of training
that lawyers receive effectively inoculates them from identity-protective
cognition. If this is so, we would expect both lawyers and judges to avoid the
forms of identity-protective cognition predicted to be triggered in members
of the general-population sample. They would display this resistance to
biased reasoning, moreover, for both the statutory interpretation problems
and the risk-perception battery, for, on this view, legal training is seen as
effectively negating vulnerability to identity-protective reasoning generally.
A result consistent with ICI would, frankly, be shocking. As explained,
previous studies show that identity-protective reasoning, far from being
mitigated, appears to be aggravated by greater proficiency in the forms of
critical reasoning that System 2 information processing comprises.128 Because
legal training focuses primarily on critical reasoning, it would thus be quite
remarkable to discover that it supplies a form of immunity to identityprotective reasoning generally. On the contrary, the phenomenon of
motivated System 2 reasoning supplies greater reason to expect UV than ICI
to be correct.129
c. Domain-Specific Immunity
A more plausible alternative to UV is what we will call the “domainspecific immunity” (DSI) hypothesis. DSI predicts that lawyer and judge
members of the sample will display resistance to identity-protective cognition
but only in their responses to the legal-problem component of the study. In

126
127
128
129

See supra notes 22–26 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 30–35 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text.
See Kahan, supra note 16, at 409; Kahan, Peters, Dawson & Slovic, supra note 79, at 17.
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response to the risk-perception component, DSI posits that lawyers and
judges will display the same vulnerability that members of the public do to
the pressure to assimilate their assessments of information to conclusions that
affirm the status and outlooks of their cultural groups.130
DSI is rooted in Margolis’s understanding of professional judgment as a
species of pattern recognition. As we discussed,131 Llewellyn’s concept of
“situation sense” furnishes an account of legal professional judgment
consistent with Margolis’s. On this account, “habits of mind”132—consisting
of effortful, System 2 forms of critical reasoning, certainly, but also intuitive,
perceptive forms of cognition—equip lawyers, including judges, with a
reliable capacity to fix their attention on the features of a controversy
pertinent to its resolution. They also inure them to the influence of
extraneous considerations that predictably bias the judgment on non-legally
trained members of the public in much the same way that risk experts are
inured to those biases on Margolis’s account.133 One of the sources of bias
that lawyers and judges’ professional judgment would protect them from,
according to the DSI hypothesis, is identity-protective cognition.
It is worth specifying with more precision what an outcome consistent
with DSI would look like in the legal problem portion of the study. One could
interpret Llewellyn’s view of “situation sense,” understood as an instance of
the form of professional judgment Margolis describes, as implying that judges
will uniformly agree on how all or almost all legal problems should be
resolved. But in our view, this would be closer to a caricature than a plausible
rendering of the concept of “situation sense.” A more realistic (as it were)
conception of “situation sense,” we submit, can usefully be understood as
predicting that lawyers and judges will largely agree on case outcomes, and
that when they do not, they will still agree on what sorts of considerations are
appropriate to the reasoned disposition of such controversies. On this view,
when one lawyer or judge disagrees with another’s view of what the “correct”
decision is in a particular case, he or she will still be able to recognize that
decision as validly decided because (or so long as) it is grounded in
considerations that are indeed pertinent to its resolution under the law.
A decision based on ideological considerations extrinsic to the legal rule or
doctrine that governs a controversy (e.g., a cultural affinity with one of the
parties) will be recognized by lawyers and judges as invalid whether or not
they agree with the outcome. DSI, then, predicts not necessarily that the

130
131
132
133

See Dane & Pratt, supra note 85, at 43.
See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text.
See MARGOLIS, supra note 15, at 49.
See id. at 35-36, 67-68, 94-95.
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lawyers and judges will uniformly agree on the outcomes of the Littering and
Disclosure problems, although one might expect that they will be largely in
agreement. It predicts only that differences of opinion among the lawyer and judge
study participants will not reflect differences in those judge’ cultural worldviews.
But again, DSI predicts that judges and lawyers will reliably converge on
decisionmaking factors independent of their cultural outlooks only in the
legal-problem component of the study because only that component of the
study features the exercise of legal professional judgment.134 The outcome
most consistent with DSI, then, would be one in which judges and lawyers
resist identity-protective cognition only with respect to the legal-problem
component and not the risk-perception component.
d. Acquired Impartiality
A final conjecture, which we call the Acquired Neutrality (AN)
hypothesis, predicts that only judges and not lawyers will display resistance
to identity-protective reasoning. On this account, what confers judges’
immunity to identity-protective reasoning is not the training and experience
common to membership in the legal profession, but instead the habitual,
willed exercise of neutrality that is peculiar to the task of judging.
Conceivably, this acquired immunity to identity-protective reasoning might
apply across all manner of domain; or alternatively, it might be more limited,
negating identity-protective cognition in judges only when they are engaged
in the form of reasoning that they use to decide cases. Under the former view,
AN predicts that judges, but not lawyers, will resist identity-protective
cognition in their response to both the legal-problem portion of the study and
the risk-perception portion. Under the latter, AN predicts judges alone will
avoid the influence of unconscious partisan reasoning, but only in the legalproblem component of the study.
2. Law Students
What about law students? Obviously, if UV is correct, we should expect
them, like lawyers and judges and members of the public generally, to display
identity-protective reasoning in their responses to all of the study outcome
measures. The same would be true under AI.

134 See Dane & Pratt, supra note 85, at 43 (“Because complex schemas develop in a particular
domain (one’s area of expertise), they are more likely to lead to effective decisions in that domain
than when used in a different domain or context. Thus, complex managerial schemas may serve a
manager well at the office but may lead to inaccurate intuitive judgments at home.”).

2016]

“Ideology” or “Situation Sense”?

389

ISI and DSI, however, do not necessarily imply that law students will
resist identity-protective cognition either. Students are at only an
intermediate stage of professionalization; their “situation sense,” one might
thus suppose, is imperfect. On this view, then, ISI and DSI could be
understood to predict that law students would display identity-protective
cognition, but to a smaller degree than members of the public generally.
The Redding–Reppucci study found that, while judges were influenced
by political commitments on a determination (the constitutionality of the
death penalty) that turned on normative commitments intrinsic to law, they
were unaffected by those commitments in making evidentiary rulings that
were analytically distinct from such commitments.135 The same was not true
of law students.136 As a result of that study’s design, there is ambiguity about
the inferences that can be drawn from the results.137 Nevertheless, a finding
in this study that the legal-problem responses of students, but not of judges,
display sensitivity to the cultural congeniality of the experimentally
manipulated case outcomes would supply reason to attribute the results in
Redding–Reppucci study to the power of professional judgment to
counteract unconscious political predispositions.
C. Analytic Method and Statistical Power
The study hypotheses feature competing predictions about the impact of
identity-protective cognition on the various types of subjects in both the
legal-problem and risk-perception components of the study. In the legalproblem version of the study, we anticipated using multivariate regression
analysis to test for three-way interactions between subject type, cultural
worldview predictors, and experimental assignment in the statutoryinterpretation problem component of the study.138 For the risk-perception
component, we anticipated using multivariate regression analysis to test for
two-way interactions between cultural worldviews and subject type
predictors.
We anticipated using a hybrid “frequentist-Bayesian” testing strategy for
the legal problem component of the study. In conventional null hypothesis

Redding & Reppucci, supra note 68.
Id.
137 See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text.
138 See generally J ACOB C OHEN , P ATRICIA C OHEN , S TEPHEN G. W EST & LEONA S.
AIKEN, APPLIED MULTIPLE REGRESSION/CORRELATION ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCES 555-56 (2003); Charles M. Judd, Everyday Data Analysis in Social Psychology: Comparisons
of Linear Models, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL AND PERSONALITY
PSYCHOLOGY 370, 374-75 (Harry T. Reis & Charles M. Judd eds., 2000).
135
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testing, a hypothesis is deemed “corroborated” if one can “reject the null
hypothesis” at “p < 0.05”—that is, if one can say that the probability is less
than 5% that one would have obtained an experimental effect as big as (or
bigger than) the one observed were the “true effect” zero.139 We anticipated
using this form of analysis to assess whether different subject types’ responses
displayed the relationship with their cultural worldviews that would suggest
the influence of identity-protective cognition, and whether that impact
differed in degree among different types of subjects.
In contrast, Bayesian hypothesis testing assesses the probability of
obtaining the effect observed in the experiment for two or more competing
hypotheses. The relative magnitude of those probabilities is the equivalent of
a Bayesian “likelihood ratio.” For example, one might say that observing a
particular set of results would be 5—or 500 or 0.2 or 0.002, etc.—times as
likely if one hypothesis were true than if a rival one were.140
The likelihood ratio does not reflect the probability that a hypothesis is
true. Instead, it reflects the degree to which one should, based on the evidence
in question, revise one’s previous assessment of the probability of truth one
attaches to a hypothesis or proposition.141 In an experimental setting, the
likelihood ratio can be treated as an index of the weight with which the
evidence supports one hypotheses in relation to the another.142
Under Bayes’ theorem, the strength of new evidence (the likelihood ratio)
is analytically independent of one’s prior assessment of the probability of the
hypothesis in question. The weight to be assigned any particular piece of
evidence, in other words, is to be determined on the basis of the validity of
the methods and inferences that produced it—not on whether the evidence

139 See generally ROBERT P. A BELSON , S TATISTICS AS P RINCIPLED ARGUMENT 40 (1995);
Jacob Cohen, The Earth Is Round (p<05), 49 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 997 (1994).
140 See Ward Edwards, Harold Lindman & Leonard J. Savage, Bayesian Statistical Inference for
Psychological Research, 70 PSYCHOL. REV. 193 (1963); Steven N. Goodman, Introduction to Bayesian
Methods I: Measuring the Strength of Evidence, 2 CLINICAL TRIALS 282, 287-288 (2005); Michael
Lavine, What Is Bayesian Statistics and Why Everything Else Is Wrong, 20 UMAP J. 165, 166-167 (1999).
See generally I. Jack Good, Weight of Evidence: A Brief Survey, in BAYESIAN STATISTICS 2:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND VALENCIA INTERNATIONAL MEETING 249 (J. M. Bernardo,
et al. eds., 1985) (describing evolution and benefits of use of likelihood ratio as devices for assessing
evidentiary “weight”).
141 See Richard O. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 M ICH . L. REV. 1021, 1026 (1977); cf.
Michael O. Finkelstein & William B. Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83
HARV. L. REV. 489, 502 (1970) (“[A] defendant could be a thousand times more likely to be guilty
than someone selected at random and still more likely to be innocent than guilty.”).
142 See generally I. J. Good, Causal Tendency, Necessitivity and Sufficientivity: an Updated Review,
in 1 PATRICK SUPPES, SCIENTIFIC PHILOSOPHER: PROBABILITY AND PROBABILISTIC
CAUSALITY 293 (Paul Humphrey ed., 1994); Good, supra note 140.
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supports or challenges what one already believes.143 Because neither the
validity nor the weight of our study results thus depends on holding any
particular prior beliefs about the political bias of judges, we report only the
indicated likelihood ratios and leave it to readers to adjust their own beliefs
accordingly.
Based on previous studies, we determined that 800 subjects would be
more than ample for observing meaningful identity-protective-reasoning
effects. Sample size targets for judges, lawyers, and law students were
determined after analysis of the general-public sample results, the effect sizes
of which indicated that n’s of 225 would generate over a 0.95 chance of
observing a comparable one, and over an 0.80 chance of observing one even
half as large, at p < 0.05.144
IV. RESULTS
A. Legal Reasoning
We consider first how the subjects responded to the legal-problem
component of the study. We start with summary analyses based on simple
tabulations of the responses of various subject types and worldviews in the
different versions of the two statutory interpretation problems. We then
present multivariate analyses designed to test the study hypotheses.
1. Summary Data
a. Outcomes by Subject Type
Taken as a whole, members of the public displayed little agreement on
the proper outcomes in the legal problems. Regardless of the version of the
problem analyzed, members of the public split nearly 50–50 on whether the
defendant in Disclosure had violated the statute—that is, on whether the
statute should be read to require proof of “knowledge” of the illegality of his
143 Psychologically speaking, the mistake of deriving the likelihood ratio or weight to be
assigned new evidence from one’s prior beliefs, or more generally from one’s willingness to assent
to the truth of the hypothesis, is confirmation bias. See generally STANOVICH, supra note 93;
Matthew Rabin & Joel L. Schrag, First Impressions Matter: A Model of Confirmatory Bias, 114 Q.J.
ECON. 37 (1999).
144 The conventional threshold for statistical power—a measure of the likelihood of observing
a posited effect size at a specified threshold of statistical significance, conditional on sample size—
is 0.80. See generally Stephen G. West, Jeremy C. Biesanz, & Steven C. Pitts, Causal Inference and
Generalization in Field Settings: Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs, in HANDBOOK OF
RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL AND PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY 40, 53 (Harry T. Reis &
Charles M. Judd eds., 2000).
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disclosure of confidential investigatory information to either the “pro-life” or
“pro-choice” family planning centers (Figure 3). Members of the public
assigned to the “construction worker” version of Littering were also close to
equally divided on whether leaving reusable water containers unattended in
the desert constituted “depositing . . . junk” or “debris” in a wildlife preserve;
those assigned to the “immigrant aid” version, however, favored treating such
behavior as a violation of the statute by a 65% to 35% margin (Figure 4).
The statutory interpretation problems in our study featured genuine
ambiguities. Dictionary definitions and rules of grammar did not compel one
result over the other in either problem. It is thus not surprising that members
of the public displayed a high level of disagreement on the proper outcomes.
Figure 3: Disclosure Problem: Decisions Overall
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Note: Panels reflect the percentage of indicated type of subjects who selected indicated results in
specified versions of the Disclosure problem.

The situation was quite different, however, among both the lawyers and
the judges who participated in our study. Regardless of the version of
Disclosure they evaluated, decided majorities of both of these types of
subjects indicated that the defendant police officer had indeed violated the
statute (Figure 3). In Littering, decided majorities concluded that placing
unattended reusable water containers in the desert did not constitute
“discarding . . . debris” in a wildlife preserve—whether done by immigrant
aid or construction workers (Figure 4). Most lawyers and judges, then,
perceived something in each problem that guided them to a consensus
interpretation, notwithstanding the ambiguity of the statutory language.
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The overall level of agreement among the law students was intermediate
between the ones observed among members of the public, on the one hand,
and among lawyers and judges, on the other. In Disclosure, the students, like
the lawyers and judges, were inclined to find a statutory violation in both the
“pro-life center” and “pro-choice center” versions (Figure 3).
Figure 4: Littering Problem: Decisions Overall
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Note: Panels reflect the percentage of indicated type of subjects who selected indicated results in
specified versions of the Littering problem.

The students displayed much less agreement on the proper outcome in
Littering. In the “immigrant aid” version, they were almost evenly divided.
They favored finding no violation in the “construction worker” version,
although by a margin (62%:38%) that fell short of the ones by which lawyers
and judges supported that disposition in both versions of the problem (Figure
4).
b. Outcomes in Relation to Subject Worldviews
There was a noticeable relationship between the cultural worldviews of
members of the public and how they ruled in the legal problems (Figure 5).
Thus, in Littering, 77% of the Hierarchical Individualists assigned to the
“immigrant aid” version but only 41% assigned to the “construction worker”
version supported finding a violation. For Egalitarian Communitarians, the
relationship was reversed: only 52% supported finding a violation in the
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“immigrant aid” version, whereas 74% supported finding a violation in the
“construction worker” version. These patterns were consistent with the study
predictions of how identity-protective cognition would influence subjects
with these outlooks in the Littering case.
Figure 5: Outcomes by Subject Type and Cultural Worldview in Littering
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Note: Panels reflect the percentage of subjects of type and worldview who indicated support for
finding a violation in one or another version of the Littering problem.

Cultural divisions were more modest but still apparent among members
of the public in Disclosure (Figure 6). Egalitarian Individualist and
Hierarchical Communitarian subjects favored finding a violation of the
statute by narrow but roughly equal margins (52% to 48% and 53% to 47%,
respectively) in the “pro-choice center” version. But in the “pro-life center”
version, subjects with these identities diverged: whereas 60% of the
Egalitarian Individualists concluded the officer had violated the statute by
alerting the anti-abortion family-counseling center of its possible infiltration
by a pro-choice activist, only 39% of Hierarchical Communitarian subjects
did. While less dramatic than the effect in Littering, this disparity, too, fit
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the study predictions on how identity-protective cognition would affect the
disposition of individuals with these worldviews to find violations in the two
versions of Disclosure.
There was no evidence of comparable effects in the responses of the
judges. In Littering, Egalitarian Communitarian judges were slightly less
likely, not more, to find the defendants had violated the statute in the
“immigrant aid” version than were Hierarchical Individualist judges. In
addition, the proportion of Egalitarian Communitarian judges who supported
finding a violation did not increase but rather decreased slightly in the
“construction worker” version (Figure 5). The proportion of Hierarchical
Individualist judges finding a violation in the “construction worker” version
also decreased by a small amount—but judges with that cultural worldview
remained more likely to find the construction workers liable than did
Egalitarian Communitarian judges. None of these differences, all of which
were small, displayed the relationship between worldviews and outcome
judgments suggestive of identity-protective cognition.
The responses of the lawyer members of the study sample were also not
suggestive of identity-protective cognition. In Littering, Hierarchical
Individualist lawyers were modestly more likely to find a violation in both
versions (“construction worker”: 33%; “immigrant aid”: 40%) than were
Egalitarian Communitarian lawyers (“construction worker”: 25%;
“immigrant aid”: 33%). The latter, moreover, were slightly less likely, not
more, to find a violation in the “immigrant aid” version than they were in the
“construction worker” version. In Disclosure, a higher proportion of
Egalitarian Individualist lawyers (95%) than Hierarchical Communitarian
ones (82%) supported finding the defendant officer violated the statute when
he exposed the pro-choice activist’s effort to obtain a position at the religious,
pro-life family planning center. But the proportion of Egalitarian
Individualist lawyers who supported finding a violation (88%) was also higher
than the proportion of Hierarchical Communitarian ones who did (83%) in
the “pro-choice center” version, where the police officer had tipped off the
pro-choice family planning center that a job applicant had concealed his
identity as a pro-life activist. In both versions, moreover, lawyers
overwhelmingly construed the statute as dispensing with the need to prove
the officer “knew” his conduct was illegal.
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Figure 6: Outcomes by Subject Type and Cultural Worldview in
Disclosure
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Note: Panels reflect the percentage of subjects of type and worldview who indicated support for
finding a violation in one or another version of the Disclosure problem.

Among the students, in contrast, cultural divisions were again evident.
Cultural dissensus was most pronounced in Disclosure (Figure 6). Eighty-six
percent of Egalitarian Individualist students, but only 63% of Hierarchical
Communitarian ones, favored finding the police officer violated the statute
in the “pro-life center” version. But in “pro-choice”—the version in which
the officer tipped off the pro-choice family counseling center of possible
infiltration by a pro-life activist—78% of Hierarchical Communitarians, and
only 65% of Egalitarian Individualists, supported finding a violation. This
inversion reflects the pattern associated with identity-protective cognition.
In Littering, comparable proportions of Egalitarian Communitarian
students (68%) and Hierarchical Individualist ones (64%) favored finding no
violation of the statute in the “construction worker” version. But in the
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“immigrant aid” version, a 20% gap emerged between Hierarchal
Individualist students, 63% of whom favored finding a violation, and
Egalitarian Communitarian ones, only 43% of whom supported that outcome
(Figure 5). This pattern was also consistent with the predicted impact of the
experimental manipulation on individuals with the specified cultural outlooks.
2. Multivariate Regression
a. Generally
The impact of subject type, worldview, and experimental assignment was
probed more systematically with multivariate logistical regression analysis.
For each problem, a regression model was constructed to enable statistical
estimation of the probability that different subject types (member of the
public, law student, lawyer, or judge) would find a violation conditional on
the subject’s worldview and the version of the problem.145
Monte Carlo simulations based on the regression models were performed
to facilitate interpretation of the results. In a Monte Carlo simulation, the
regression model outcome variable is calculated and randomly adjusted by an
amount reflecting the measurement error associated with the model
parameters. This process is repeated a sufficient number of times to populate
the entire probability distribution for the outcome variable at specified values
of the model predictors.146 Using this technique, the probability that a
decisionmaker would find a violation was computed a thousand times for each
combination of subject type, cultural worldview, and experimental
assignment of interest (Appendix A, Figure A1, Figure A2).147 Differences in
the predicted probabilities of finding a violation conditional on worldview or
experimental assignment were determined in the same fashion.148
b. Judges versus Members of the Public Using Frequentist Methods
Figure 7 reports simulated estimates of the size of the interaction between
subject worldviews and the experimental assignment for a member of the

The regression analyses for the legal problems appear in Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix A.
See ANDREW GELMAN & JENNIFER HILL, DATA ANALYSIS USING REGRESSION AND
MULTILEVEL/HIERARCHICAL MODELS 137-51 (2007).
147 The continuous “hierarchy–egalitarianism” and “individualism–communitarianism”
predictors were set at +1 SD; +1 SD for “Hierarchical Individualist”; +1, -1 for “Hierarchical
Communitarian”; -1, +1 for “Egalitarian Individualist”; and -1, -1 for “Egalitarian Communitarian.”
148 See Gary King, Michael Tomz, & Jason Wittenberg, Making the Most of Statistical Analyses:
Improving Interpretation and Presentation, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 347, 349-353 (2000).
145

146
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public and for a judge, respectively. There are separate estimates for each
problem and for the “average effect” based on responses to both problems.149
Figure 7: Judges vs. Public: Estimated Impact of
Identity Protective Cognition
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Note: The figure is derived from Monte Carlo simulations based on Regression Model 3, Table A1,
and Model 3, Table A2, both of which appear in Appendix A. The curves reflect the density
distributions for the predicted difference in the probability that a decisionmaker with a particular
worldview (either “Hierarchical Individualist” or “Egalitarian Communitarian” in Littering or
“Hierarchical Communitarian” or “Egalitarian Individualist” in Disclosure) will find a violation if
experimentally assigned to one version of the problem versus the other. A positive value for the
difference indicates a differential consistent with the influence of identity-protective cognition.

Based on the multivariate regression models, the density distributions
reflect the predicted difference in the probability that a decisionmaker with a
particular worldview (“Hierarchical Individualist” or “Egalitarian
Communitarian” in Littering, or “Hierarchical Communitarian” or
“Egalitarian Individualist” in Disclosure) will find a violation in one version
of the problem versus the other. Equivalently, the curves reflect estimates of
how much more likely on average a decisionmaker with a particular
worldview is to interpret the statute differently when finding a violation
149 The “average” effect was derived consistently with the methods prescribed in Robert
Rosenthal & Donald B. Rubin, Meta-Analytic Procedures for Combining Studies with Multiple Effect
Sizes, 99 PSYCHOL. BULL. 400 (1986), for aggregating the effect sizes of multiple single-study
measures of a single phenomenon of interest—here the disposition of different subject types to
display identity-protective cognition.
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affirms rather than denigrates his or her cultural commitments. We thus
characterize the model outputs as indicating the predicted “identityprotective cognition impact” (IPCI) of the experimental manipulations.150
The most likely IPCI for any subject type is the mean value in the
distribution for that subject type. The probability that the “true” IPCI is
larger or smaller than that becomes progressively less likely, consistent with
the bell shape of the probability density distribution. Ninety-five percent
confidence intervals (or ones of any other size) for the “true impact” can be
determined by identifying the predicted values that bound the relevant
interval in the range of simulated probabilities.151
The results confirm that the experimental manipulations generated the
predicted identity-protective cognition effects in members of the public.
Based on the regression model for Littering, for example, the predicted
“identity-protective cognition impact” or IPCI for a member of the public is
29%. That is the best estimate, in other words, of how much being assigned
to the “immigrant aid” version of the problem as opposed to the “construction
worker” version changes the probability that either a “Hierarchical
Individualist” or an “Egalitarian Communitarian” member of the public will
find a violation. The 0.95 level of confidence for that estimate is ± 9%.152 In
Disclosure, the IPCI—the difference in the probability that either an
“Egalitarian Individualist” or “Hierarchical Communitarian” member of the
public will find a violation if assigned to the “pro-choice center” as opposed
to “pro-life center” version—is 16% (± 9%). The average IPCI for a member
of the public is 22% (± 6%) (Figure 7).153
The regression model corroborates the inference that judges were not
affected by identity-protective cognition. As is clear from the judge IPCI
probability distributions (Figure 7), the predicted IPCI for judges was not

150 For this purpose, we are treating as an “identity-protective cognition effect” a difference in
probability of finding a violation in the direction corresponding to the hypothesized effect of the
experimental manipulation. In Figure 7, differences in that direction have a positive value;
differences in direction contrary to the hypothesized effect of identity-protective cognition, in
contrast, have a negative value.
151 See Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, & Matthew M. Schneider, On the Effective
Communication of the Results of Empirical Studies, Part I, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1811, 1832-33 (2006); King,
Tomz & Wittenberg, supra note 148.
152 All confidence intervals reported in the text hereafter will reflect a 0.95 level of confidence.
153 Because each study problem constituted an indirect measure of an unobserved or latent
disposition—the propensity to process information in a manner that reflects identity-protective
cognition—the aggregated or “average” effect is more precise than either individual measure, and
thus has a smaller standard error. See Rosenthal & Rubin, supra note 149.
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different, statistically or practically, from zero in either Littering or
Disclosure.154
Moreover, the difference between the public and judge IPCIs in both
problems was large and significant, statistically and practically, in both
Littering (34%, ± 22%) and Disclosure (20%, ± 17%). The predicted average
public IPCI exceeds the predicted judge IPCI by 27% (± 14%). The “null
hypothesis”—that there is no difference in the vulnerability of judges and
members of the public to identity-protective reasoning—can thus be
“rejected.”
c. Judges versus Members of the Public Using Bayesian Methods
As an alternative to assessing the improbability of the “null hypothesis,”
one can use Bayesian methods to assess the strength of the evidence in
relation to competing hypothesized IPCIs.155 Under Bayes’ theorem the
likelihood ratio reflects how much more consistent an observed outcome is
with one hypothesis than a rival one. It is the factor in proportion to which
one should adjust one’s assessment of the relative probability (expressed in
odds) of one hypothesis in relation to the other.156
Imagine, for example, that we are shown two opaque canvas bags, labeled
“B1”and “B2,” each of which is filled with marbles (we use canvas bags for this
example in anticipation of the reasonable concern that Bayes’ theorem might
apply only to marble-filled urns). We are not told which is which, but one
bag, it is stipulated, contains 75% red marbles and 25% blue, and the other
75% blue and 25% red. We are instructed to “sample” the contents of the bags
by drawing one marble from each, after which we should make our best
estimate of the probability that B1 is the bag containing mostly blue marbles
and B2 the one containing mostly red. We extract a blue marble from B1 and
a red one from B2.
Bayes’ Theorem furnishes logical instructions on how to use this “new
evidence” to revise our estimates of the probability of the hypothesis that B1
is the bag containing mostly blue marbles (and hence B2 mostly red). If we
assume that that hypothesis is true, then the probability that we would have
drawn a blue marble from B1 is 3/4 or 0.75, as is the probability that we would

154 The negative values suggest that the “best estimate” of the effects of the judges’ cultural
outlooks on their decision making were in fact the opposite from what one would expect if judges
had been influenced by identity-protective cognition.
155 See generally Rivka M. de Vries & Richard D. Morey, Bayesian Hypothesis Testing for SingleSubject Designs, 18 PSYCHOL. METHODS 165 (2013); Goodman, supra note 140; John K. Kruschke,
Bayesian Estimation Supersedes the t Test, 142 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 573 (2013).
156 See, e.g., Lempert, supra note 141.
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have drawn a red marble from B2. The joint probability of these independent
events—that is, the probability of the two occurring together, as they did—
is 3/4 x 3/4 or 9/16. If we assume that the hypothesis “B1 is the one that
contains mostly blue marbles” is false, then the joint probability of drawing a
blue marble from B1 followed by a red marble from B2 would be 1/4 x 1/4, or
1/16. Other possible combinations of colors could have occurred, of course
(indeed, there are four possible combinations for such a trial). But if we were
to repeat this “experiment” over and over (with the marbles being replaced
and the labels on the bags being randomly reassigned after each trial), then
we would expect the sequence “blue, red” to occur nine times more often
when the bag containing mostly blue marbles is the one labeled “B1” than
when it is the bag labeled “B2.” Because “blue, red” is the outcome we
observed in our trial, we should revise our estimate of the probability of the
hypothesis “B1 contains mostly blue marbles” by a factor 9—from odds of 1:1
(50%) to 9:1 (90%).
We can use precisely the same logic to assess the relative probability of
hypothesized judge and public IPCIs. In effect, one can imagine each subject
type as an opaque vessel containing some propensity to engage in identityprotective cognition. Although the strengths of those propensities—the
subject types’ “true” IPCIs—are not amenable to direct inspection, we can
sample observable manifestations of them by performing this study’s
statutory interpretation experiment. Calculating the relative likelihood of the
observed results under competing hypotheses, we can construct a likelihood
ratio that conveys how much more consistent the evidence is with one
hypothesized subject type IPCI than with another.
Figure 8 illustrates the use of this method to test two competing
hypotheses about the public’s “true” IPCI: that members of the public would
be 25% more likely to find a violation when doing so is culturally affirming,
and alternatively that they would be only 15% more likely to do so. To make
the rival hypothesis commensurable with the study results, we can represent
each as a probability distribution with the predicted IPCI as its mean and a
standard error equivalent to the one observed in the experimental results.
Within any one such distribution, the relative probability of alternative
IPCIs (e.g., 15% and 25%) can be determined by assessing their relative
“heights” on that particular curve.157 Likewise, the relative probability of
observing any particular IPCI under alternative distributions can be
157 The units that appear on the y-axis are in fact completely irrelevant for this purpose.
Consistent with convention, we compare probability densities, which are the first derivative of (rate
of change in) cumulative probability distribution associated with the logistic regression function
that generates the underlying probabilities.
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determined by comparing the ratio of the heights for the probability density
distributions in question.158
Figure 8: Assessing the Weight of the Evidence: Competing Hypotheses
for Public IPCI
observed data 8x more consistent with hypothesis that public
IPCI = 25% than with hypothesis that public IPCI = 15%
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Note: The weight of the evidence in relation to two hypotheses can be determined by deriving a
likelihood ratio from the probability density distributions associated with those hypotheses. Here,
probability distributions reflecting the indicated hypotheses were constructed using the standard
error (0.03) associated with the observed Public IPCI in the experiment. The probability of obtaining
the observed experimental result is eight times greater under hypothesis 1 than hypothesis 2.

The public IPCI was 22%. The probability of observing such a result (or
any in close proximity to it) is eight times more likely under the more extreme
“public IPCI = 25%” hypothesis than it is under the more modest “public
IPCI = 15%” hypothesis (Figure 8).159 This is the Bayesian likelihood ratio,
or the factor in proportion to which one should modify one’s assessment of
the relative probability that the “true” public IPCI is 25% as opposed to 15%.
158 See Steven N. Goodman, Toward Evidence-Based Medical Statistics. 2: The Bayes Factor, 130
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 1005 (1999).
159 See generally Goodman, supra note 140.
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We will use the same process to assess the weight of four competing
hypotheses about the vulnerability of judges to identity protective cognition.
The first is that judges will be “unaffected” (IPCI = 0). This prediction, of
course, appears similar to the “null hypothesis.” But whereas “null hypothesis
testing” purports to specify only whether the null hypothesis can be rejected,
Bayesian methods can be used to obtain a genuine assessment of the strength
of the evidence in support of there being “no effect” if that is a genuine
hypothesis of interest, as it is here.160 The remaining three hypotheses, the
plausibility of which will be tested relative to the “IPCI = 0” hypothesis are
that judges will be “just as affected as the public” (IPCI = 22%); that judges
will be moderately affected (IPCI = 10%); and that judges will be affected to
only a comparatively mild degree (IPCI = 5%).161
The results are reflected in Figure 9. Not surprisingly, the experimental
data are much more supportive of the first hypothesis—that judges would be
unaffected by the experimental manipulation—than with the second—that
they would be “as affected as much as the public.” Indeed, because the
probability that we would have observed the actual experimental result if the
latter hypothesis is true is astronomically low, there is little practical value in
assigning a likelihood ratio to how much more strongly the evidence supports
the hypothesis that judges were “unaffected” by the experimental
manipulation.
Figure 9: Judge IPCI: Evidentiary Weight of Experimental Data
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160 See Kruschke, supra note 155, at 577; Richard D. Morey & Jeffrey N. Rouder, Bayes Factor
Approaches for Testing Interval Null Hypotheses, 16 PSYCHOL. METHODS 406 (2011).
161 See generally Goodman, supra note 158.
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Note: The probability distributions reflecting the indicated hypotheses were constructed using the
standard error (0.06) associated with the observed Judge IPCI in the experiment. The horizontal
line intersecting the probability distributions is the observed judge IPCI (-5%).

Of course, members of the public were influenced by their cultural
predispositions to a strikingly large extent. To learn that the evidence
strongly disfavors the inference that judges are that biased does not in itself
give us much insight into whether judges possess the capacity for impartial
decisionmaking that their duties demand. It was precisely for that reason that
less extreme IPCIs were also hypothesized.
Even those predictions, however, proved to be less supported by the
evidence than was the hypothesis that judges would be unaffected by identityprotective reasoning. The evidence was twenty times more consistent with the
“judge IPCI = 0” hypothesis than the “judge IPCI = 10%” hypothesis. The
weight of the evidence was not as decided but still favored—by a factor of
about three—the “judge IPCI = 0” hypothesis over the “judge IPCI = 5%”
hypothesis (Figure 9).
d. Lawyers and Law Students, Both Methods
The simulated probability distributions for lawyers and law students are
graphically represented in Figure 10. The average lawyer IPCI was neither
practically nor meaningfully different from zero (2%, ± 14%). In addition, the
difference between the lawyer and public IPCIs was 20% (± 16%). One can
thus “reject” the “null hypothesis” that the difference in the magnitude of the
lawyer and public responses to the experimental manipulation was zero.
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Figure 10: Lawyers & Law Students: Estimated IPCI
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Note: Derived from Monte Carlo simulation based on regression model 3 in Table A1 and regression
model 3, Table A2 in Appendix A. Density distributions reflect the predicted difference in the
probability that a decisionmaker with a particular worldview (either “Hierarchical Individualist” or
“Egalitarian Communitarian” in Littering or “Hierarchical Communitarian” or “Egalitarian
Individualist” in Disclosure) will find a violation if experimentally assigned to one version of the
problem versus the other.162 A positive value for the difference indicates a differential consistent
with the influence of identity-protective cognition.

The evidence for the students is more equivocal. In both problems, the
predicted student IPCI was greater than zero, and on average it was 12%
(± 14%). This effect—the difference in how likely a student decisionmaker is
to find a violation when that outcome is identity-affirming rather than
identity-denigrating—is not statistically significant at “p < 0.05”; it is
significant at only “p = 0.10.” But the difference between the student and
public IPCI’s was not statistically significant at p < 0.05 either (10%, ± 15%;
p = 0.20). Accordingly, if one uses “null hypothesis testing” criteria, one can
reject neither the hypothesis that students were unaffected by identityprotective cognition nor the hypothesis that they were affected just as much
as members of the public—who by this same mode of assessment can be deemed
to have been strongly influenced by this same form of bias (22%, ± 6%).

162

See generally King, Tomz, & Wittenberg, supra note 148.
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Figure 11: Student IPCI: Evidentiary Weight of Experimental Data

Note: The probability distributions reflecting the indicated hypotheses were constructed using the
standard error (0.07) associated with the observed student IPCI in the experiment. The horizontal
line intersecting the probability distributions is the observed student IPCI (12%).

More information can be extracted from the results, however, if one
computes the likelihood ratios for competing hypotheses about the size of the
“true” student IPCI. Figure 11 indicates that the experimental evidence is
very slightly—1.5 times—more consistent with the hypothesis that the “true”
student IPCI is “as large as” the public IPCI that with the “student IPCI =
0” hypothesis. However, the evidence is even more supportive of the “student
IPCI = 10%” hypothesis, which is over two times more consistent with the
evidence than is the “as big as the public” hypothesis. The “student IPCI =
10%” hypothesis is also nearly twice as consistent with the evidence than is
the “student IPCI = 5%” hypothesis.
Again, the use of “null hypothesis testing” methods supported no
particular inference about the impact of identity-protective cognition on
student subjects. But using Bayesian methods to assess the weight of the
evidence in relation to these competing hypotheses suggests the most
supported one is that the students would be affected about half as much by
the experimental manipulation as were members of the public.
Figure 12 illustrates the use of this method to test competing hypotheses
about the lawyer IPCI. The weight of the evidence against the hypothesis
that lawyers will be affected as much as the public is quite strong: the “lawyer
IPCI = 0” hypothesis is over 100 times more consistent with the evidence.
The evidence also more strongly supports—by a factor of just over two—the
“lawyer IPCI = 0” hypothesis over the “lawyer IPCI = 10%” hypothesis.
On the final hypothesis—that lawyers would be 5% more likely to find a
violation when such an outcome was culturally affirming rather than culturally
denigrating—the evidence is effectively silent. Generating a likelihood ratio of
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very close to one, the experimental results are effectively equally consistent
with the “lawyer IPCI = 0” and “lawyer IPCI = 5%” hypotheses.
Figure 12: Lawyer IPCI: Evidentiary Weight of Experimental Data
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Note: The probability distributions reflecting the indicated hypotheses were constructed using the
standard error (0.07) associated with the observed lawyer IPCI in the experiment. The horizontal
line intersecting the probability distributions is the observed lawyer IPCI (2%).

e. Judges versus Lawyers
Comparing Figures 9 and 12 reveals that the evidence supports the
“unaffected” hypothesis relative to each of its rivals more strongly in the case
of judges than in the case of lawyers. But it would be a mistake to infer on
that basis that the evidence supports by a comparable margin the hypothesis
that judges are more likely than lawyers to be unaffected by identityprotective cognition by a substantial degree.
Neither the judge IPCI (-5%, ± 12%) nor the lawyer IPCI (2%, ± 14%) is
statistically or practically different from zero. If we model each rival to the
“no effect” hypotheses as a mean or “most likely” value atop a bell-shaped
probability density distribution, then the probability of observing the judge
IPCI will be even more dramatically improbable than observing the lawyer
IPCI within any of the relevant distributions.
But the gap between the judge and lawyer IPCIs is itself relatively
modest—8% (± 19%), a difference that also fails to satisfy the conventional
“null hypothesis” level of statistical significance. Accordingly, the probability
of observing both values when the hypothesized difference is relatively small
should be greater than the probability of observing both when the
hypothesized difference is relatively large.
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Figure 13: Judge–Lawyer IPCI Differential
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Note: The left-hand panel juxtaposes probability density distributions for predicted lawyer and judge
IPCIs (see supra Figures 7 & 10). The probability distributions reflecting the indicated hypotheses
were constructed using the standard error (0.10) associated with the observed difference in judge
and lawyer IPCIs.

This point is illustrated in Figure 13, which juxtaposes the probability distributions for two competing hypotheses about the size of the difference between the judge and lawyer IPCIs: 0% vs. 10%. The meager 1.2 likelihood
ratio in favor of the latter hypothesis signifies that the evidence in support of
it is only trivially greater than the evidence in support of the former “equal
IPCI” hypothesis.
B. Risk Perceptions
As indicated, the subjects responded to a battery of items measuring their
perceptions of various societal risks. These were combined to form separate
“environmental risk” and “social deviancy risk” scales.163
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See supra Part III.
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Figure 14: Societal Risk Concerns
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Note: The bars reflect standardized (z-score) means of indicated risk perceptions for subjects holding
indicated worldviews (as determined by relationship of their scores to means on the Hierarchy–
Egalitarianism and Individualism–Communitarianism scales). Error bars reflect 0.95 level of
confidence for “true mean.”

Subject responses displayed the characteristic forms of variance associated
with identity-protective cognition. Thus, subjects became less concerned
with environmental risks, such as global warming and nuclear power, as they
became more hierarchical and individualistic and more concerned with them
as they became more egalitarian and communitarian (ΔM = 1.34, tstatistic = 20.05, p < 0.01). Greater concern with social deviancy risks, such as
legalization of marijuana and teen pregnancy, was associated with being more
hierarchical and communitarian, whereas being more egalitarian and
individualistic predicted less concern (ΔM = 0.33, t-statistic = 6.76, p < 0.01).
These constellations of risk perceptions are consistent with reliance on
cultural cognition, a form of motivated reasoning that consists of selectively
crediting and discrediting information about societal risks in patterns that
protect one’s standing in a cultural group for which membership is associated
with the risk perceptions in question.164
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See generally Kahan & Braman, supra note 111; Wildavsky & Dake, supra note 125.
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The same patterns of risk perceptions were readily observable in the
judge, lawyer, and law student members of the sample (Figure 14).
Multivariate testing corroborated that all subject types were culturally
polarized to a substantial degree (Table A3). The size of the differences varied
but not in patterns consistent with the inference that either legal practice or
the experience of being a judge confers meaningful resistance to identityprotective reasoning for judgments unrelated to legal decisionmaking
(Appendix A, Figure A3).165
V. TAKING STOCK
A. So Are Judges Political?
The aim of this study was to test whether legal reasoning on the part of
judges displays the characteristics of identity-protective cognition. Because
that dynamic predictably generates culturally or ideologically biased
information processing, evidence that judges are vulnerable to identityprotective reasoning would support the popular and scholarly indictment that
judges—lower court ones and Supreme Court Justices alike—are mere
“politicians in robes.”
More concretely, the nature of the sample and the design of the study
were self-consciously constructed to enable testing of four distinct
hypotheses. The first was Universal Vulnerability or UV, which predicted
that judges, lawyers, and law students would display the same vulnerability
to identity-protective reasoning as members of the public. UV is the
hypothesis associated with dominant scholarly accounts, both observational
and experimental, of the impact of ideology on judicial decisionmaking.
The results of the study were strongly at odds with UV. Both statutory
interpretation problems excited strong evidence of identity-protective
cognition—the form of biased information processing associated with
political polarization—in members of the general public, but not in lawyers or
judges. Neither judges nor lawyers displayed practically or statistically
meaningful signs of being influenced by the cultural congeniality of the
experimentally manipulated case outcomes.
The second hypothesis was Identity-Protective Cognition Immunity
(ICI): that legal training would imbue lawyers and judges with resistance to
identity-protective cognition generally by virtue of its effect in strengthening
critical reasoning abilities. This hypothesis, the vindication of which would
have been contrary to existing research that suggests identity-protective
165

See infra Appendix A.
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cognition is in fact amplified by critical reasoning proficiency,166 was also not
supported by the study. The societal risk perceptions of lawyers and judges
(and law students, too) displayed the relationship to their cultural worldviews
that is the signature of identity-protective reasoning on contested matters of
public policy.
The third hypothesis—Domain-Specific Immunity (DSI)—predicted
exactly this pattern. The basis for DSI was the expectation that professional
training and experience could be expected to instill in lawyers and judges
habits of mind resistant to identity-protective cognition when performing the
types of reasoning tasks characteristic of their profession—but not otherwise.
Consistent with this hypothesis, judges and lawyers who were as divided as
members of the public generally on risk issues like climate change and
marijuana legalization displayed remarkably high degrees of convergence in
their analysis of legal problems that provoked cultural polarization in
members of the public. 167
The final hypothesis—Acquired Neutrality (AN)—predicted that judges
alone would display resistance to identity-protective reasoning. The basis for
this hypothesis was the surmise that the experience of willfully engaging in
neutral decisionmaking would endow judges with a distinctive ability to stifle
unconscious motivations to conform their assessments of information to their
defining group commitments.
The weight of the evidence in support of rejecting various hypothesized
degrees of vulnerability to identity-protective cognition was in fact
consistently stronger in the case of the judges than the lawyers. But the
evidence was amply strong in the lawyers’ case. It would seem odd, then, to
conclude that the demonstrated neutrality of the judges in this study is
attributable to the habitual exercise of their special duties rather than to the
habits of mind associated with legal training and experience generally.
The strength of the evidence for DSI in this study is strongly at odds with
previous studies purporting to find that judges resort to “ideological
considerations” when deciding cases. The conflict is most likely attributable
to the methodological limitations present in the latter studies but selfconsciously corrected in this one. Observational studies, it has been pointed
out, exaggerate the role of such influences by use of both biased samples—
See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text.
This result is very much in keeping with the ones reported in Wistrich, Rachlinski & Guthrie, supra note 60. The “emotional” sensibilities that they view as “motivating” judges to reach different outcomes in cases involving “sympathetic” and “unsympathetic” parties can be understood as
evincing a shared professional sensibility that guided ideologically diverse judges to converge on outcomes
perfectly consistent with the governing legal provisions. See supra notes 63–67 and accompanying
text.
166
167
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litigated cases, which consist disproportionately of ones likely to divide jurists
inclined to agree notwithstanding ideological differences—and biased
measures—outcome classifications that treat as “ideological” disagreements
based on jurisprudential considerations intrinsic to the law itself.168 This
study avoided these problems by use of an experimental design that
manipulated the subjects’ motivations to decide a problem on the basis of
cultural commitments extrinsic to the relevant legal rule. The experiment,
moreover, was performed on actual judges. The finding that judges are not
influenced by identity-protective cognition when ordinary members of the
public (including law students) are underscores the mistake of treating the
reasoning of the latter as a valid model of the reasoning of the former.
While inconsistent with scholarship suggesting that judicial
decisionmaking is “ideological,” the study results complement and extend
other work showing that judges can be expected to display at least some
measure of immunity to cognitive biases thought to interfere with the
performance of their jobs.169 Because that scholarship has focused on biases
characteristic of over-reliance on heuristic System 1 information processing,
it has not furnished grounds one way or the other for believing that judges
would be immune to identity-protective cognition, which research has shown
is magnified, not mitigated, by proficiency in the forms of conscious, effortful
System 2 information processing.170 Accordingly, the present study adds to the
growing stock of valid empirical examinations of “how judges think.”171
B. What About Law Students?
For the law student participants in our study, the results were mixed.
Overall, the evidence supports the conclusion that students were affected less
by the experimental manipulation than were members of the public.
Nevertheless, the evidence also suggests that it is likely students were affected
enough to raise doubts about their capacity to decide cases in a manner
uninfluenced by cultural commitments extrinsic to law: the evidence was
more consistent than not with the inference that the students were at least 10
percentage points more likely to find a violation when doing so suited rather
than disappointed their cultural worldviews.
168 Remarkably, some “ideology thesis” proponents use information on judges’ voting behavior
to characterize judges as “liberal” or “conservative” and then use the resulting measures to “test”
hypotheses about “ideological voting” by those judges in the very cases from which their “ideology”
classifications or scores were derived. See EPSTEIN, POSNER & LANDES, supra note 5, 113-16 & n.13.
169 See, e.g., Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 75, at 27-28.
170 See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text.
171 See generally Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 75.
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That law students would not enjoy the same capacity to resist identityprotective reasoning as judges and lawyers is not surprising and is consistent
with the Domain-Specific Immunity hypothesis. Students enjoy an immature
form of the professional judgment that fully trained and experienced lawyers
possess. It stands to reason, then, that culturally diverse students would
display less convergence in their assessment of culturally fraught legal
problems.
Indeed, our finding that students are less resistant to politically motivated
reasoning than are judges and lawyers corroborates one important component
of the Redding–Reppucci study and helps to put the full results of that study
in perspective. As we did, Redding and Reppucci found that students, but
not judges, were inclined to conform legal rulings—in their study, the
admissibility of evidence on the deterrent efficacy of the death penalty—to
their political outlooks.172
Redding and Reppucci also found that both judges and students tended
to resolve constitutional challenges to capital punishment in a manner
consistent with their political values, regardless of whether the evidence
challenged their prior views on capital punishment’s deterrent efficacy.173 But
as we have explained,174 that legal issue itself requires judges to make
normative judgments. Normative judgments, unsurprisingly, will vary across
judges of differing political outlooks. Insofar as the role of those judgments
in legal decisionmaking is intrinsic to law, however, it is not valid to treat any
correlation between legal rulings of that sort and decisionmakers’ political
outlooks as evidence of “politically” or “ideologically” biased reasoning.175
For it to be important—indeed, for it to be analytically coherent—the
claim that judges are “politically biased” requires demonstrating the
responsiveness of their rulings to political outlooks extrinsic to the legal issues
they are considering.176 The statutory interpretation rulings of the judges in
our study were not responsive to such outlooks—just as the evidentiary
rulings of the judges in the Redding–Reppucci study were not. That the legal
reasoning of law students, in our study and theirs, were not immune to this
bias furnishes reason to view both studies as evidence that professional
judgment contributes to neutralizing identity-protective cognition on judicial
decisionmaking.

172
173
174
175
176

Redding & Reppucci, supra note 68, at 47-48.
Id. at 43-49.
See supra notes 30–35 & 72 and accompanying text.
See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 11, at 1945-48.
See supra notes 30–35 and accompanying text.
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At the same time, we think it would be a mistake to treat as unimportant
our finding that students displayed at least some degree of resistance to
identity-protective cognition. Because they are likely to enjoy higher than
average proficiency in critical reasoning, law students can in fact be expected
to be more vulnerable, not less, to ideologically motivated reasoning.177 Indeed,
the risk-perception responses of the student members of our sample displayed
ample evidence of being affected by this form of information processing
generally. Yet on one problem that plainly did culturally polarize ordinary
members of the public, the students in our study were more likely to converge
on the answer that lawyers and judges recognize as correct.
The process of acquiring this species of professional judgment obviously
does not end in law school. But our study suggests that it certainly begins
there.
C. Motivated Reasoning, Professional Judgment, and Political Conflict
Using experimental methods, decision science has generated a rich
empirical literature on professional judgment. Areas of investigation have
included the interplay of unconscious and reflective modes of cognition in
expert reasoning;178 the susceptibility and resistance of professionals to biases,
in and out of domain;179 and one or another determinant of judgmental
proficiency.180
This study makes a contribution to this general body of literature as well.
It is the first to examine whether and how professional judgment interacts
with identity-protective reasoning.
See Kahan, supra note 16, at 416-17.
See, e.g., Bedard & Biggs, supra note 88 (studying hypothesis formation in accounting
professionals); Marcum, supra note 89.
179 See, e.g., Merim Bilalić, Robert Langner, Michael Erb & Wolfgang Grodd, Mechanisms and
Neural Basis of Object and Pattern Recognition: A Study with Chess Experts, 139 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 728 (2010); Jonathan J. Koehler, The Influence of Prior Beliefs on Scientific Judgments of
Evidence Quality, 56 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 28 (1993) (describing the
agreement effect of scientific judgments); Olga Kostopoulou, J. Edward Russo, Greg Keenan,
Brendan C. Delaney, & Abdel Douiri, Information Distortion in Physicians’ Diagnostic Judgments, 32
MED. DECISION MAKING 831 (2012); cf. Paul Slovic & John Monahan, Probability, Danger, and
Coercion: A Study of Risk Perception and Decision Making in Mental Health Law, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV.
49 (1995).
180 See, e.g., P HILIP E. T ETLOCK , E XPERT P OLITICAL J UDGMENT: H OW G OOD I S I T ?
HOW CAN WE KNOW? (2005) (discussing means of measuring expertise in politics); Philip M.
Fernbach, Adam Darlow & Steven A. Sloman, Neglect of Alternative Causes in Predictive but Not
Diagnostic Reasoning, 21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 329, 334 (2010); Paul Slovic, John Monahan & Donald G.
MacGregor, Violence Risk Assessment and Risk Communication: The Effects of Using Actual Cases,
Providing Instruction, and Employing Probability Versus Frequency Formats, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
271 (2000).
177
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It is not particularly surprising that this topic has not received scholarly
attention. The impact of identity-protective reasoning is not nearly so
significant for understanding and perfecting professional judgment as are the
effects of the various other cognitive dynamics featured in the decision
science literature. Recognizing that auditors, say, have a stake in forming
perceptions of societal risk that protect their status in their cultural groups is
unlikely to contribute much to assessing the role that prototypical reasoning
plays in their detection of irregularities in financial records.181 The prospect
that doctors will misdiagnose a disease because of base-rate neglect or
coherence-based reasoning, likewise, is more critical to assessing the
proficiency of physicians than is figuring out if they are likely to be
unconsciously motivated to selectively credit and dismiss data on climate
change in a manner that reflects their worldviews. The relevance of identityprotective cognition to professional judgment is much more conspicuous in
law, where assuring that facts are determined, and legal rules administered,
in a manner that is neutral as between competing cultural understandings of
the best way to live is the very form of expertise that a judge is required to
exercise.
But there is at least one other group of experts whose vulnerability to
identity-protective cognition has become an issue of speculation: scientists
who investigate risks and related facts that excite cultural polarization.
Sensibly, citizens tend to treat “scientific consensus” on environmental risk
and other highly technical matters as a reliable normative guide for
decisionmaking, collective and individual.182 But what makes it sensible for
them to do so is that the method of inquiry that scientists themselves use
does not afford existing “scientific consensus” any particular weight. On the
contrary, the entitlement of any previously supported proposition to
continued assent is, for science, conditional on its permanent amenability to
reexamination and revision in light of new evidence.183
If, then, there were reason to believe that scientists themselves were being
unconsciously motivated to discount evidence challenging “consensus”
positions on issues like climate change, say, or nuclear power or genetically
modified foods, by their cultural outlooks, that would be a reason for treating
181 Cf. Bedard & Biggs, supra note 88 (showing that hypothesis creation in auditor analysis is
not related to an auditor’s particular worldview).
182 See generally Dan M. Kahan, Hank Jenkins-Smith, & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition of
Scientific Consensus, 14 J. RISK RES. 147, 147 (2011) (noting that both sides in culturally polarizing
debates over societal risks understand their group’s position to be consistent with “scientific
consensus”—but disagree about what “scientific consensus” is as a result of identity-protective
cognition).
183 See KARL P OPPER , T HE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC D ISCOVERY 40 (1959).
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apparent scientific-consensus positions as a less reliable guide for
decisionmaking. Various commentators, including some scientists, now assert
that identity-protective reasoning has pervasively distorted the findings of
climate scientists, making their conclusions, as reflected in reports like those
issued by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,184 the National
Academy of Sciences,185 and the Royal Society,186 unreliable.187
Obviously, the best way to test this claim is by conducting valid empirical
studies of the scientists whose findings on risk or other policy-relevant facts
are being challenged on this basis. But we believe our study, although
confined to judges and lawyers, furnishes at least some evidence for
discounting the likelihood of the hypothesis that climate scientists or other
comparable experts are being influenced by identity-protective reasoning.
The reason is the connection between our study results and the theory of
professional judgment on which the study was founded.
As explained,188 the theoretical basis for our study design and hypotheses
was the account of professional judgment most conspicuously associated with
the work of Howard Margolis. Margolis treats professional judgment as
consisting of the acquisition of specialized prototypes that enable those
possessing the relevant form of expertise to converge on the recognition of
phenomena of consequence to their special decisionmaking responsibilities.
Margolis used this account of professional judgment among scientists to
help explain lay–expert conflicts over environmental risk. Nonexperts
necessarily lack the expert prototypes that figure in expert pattern
recognition. Nevertheless, members of the public possess other forms of
prototypes—ones consisting of what expert judgments look like—that help them
to recognize “who knows what about what.” Their adroit use of these
prototypes, through the cognitive process of pattern recognition, enables
them to reliably converge on what experts know, and thus to get the benefit
of it for their own decisionmaking, despite their inability to corroborate (or
even genuinely comprehend) that knowledge for themselves. Nevertheless,
in Margolis’s scheme, the bridging function that these “expertise prototypes”
play in connecting lay judgments to expert ones can be disrupted. Such

184 See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2013:
THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS: WORKING GROUP I CONTRIBUTION TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT
REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (2013).
185 See, e.g., N ATIONAL RESEARCH C OUNCIL, E COLOGICAL I MPACTS OF C LIMATE
CHANGE (2008).
186 See, e.g., ROYAL SOCIETY , P REVENTING D ANGEROUS C LIMATE C HANGE (2009).
187 See, e.g., Judith Curry, Scientists and Motivated Reasoning, CLIMATE ETC. (Aug. 20, 2013),
http://judithcurry.com/2013/08/20/scientists-and-motivated-reasoning [http://perma.cc/MMA7-KVKF].
188 See supra notes 88–99 and accompanying text.
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sources of disruption create fissures between expert and lay judgment and
resulting forms of public conflict over environmental risk.
Identity-protective cognition can be understood to be a disrupting
influence of this character. When a fact subject to expert judgment (Is the
earth heating up and are humans causing that? Does permitting citizens to
carry handguns in public make crime rates go up or down? Does the HPV
vaccine protect adolescent girls from a cancer-causing disease—or lull them
into sexual promiscuity that increases their risk of pregnancy and other
STDs?) becomes entangled in antagonistic cultural meanings, positions on
that fact can become transformed into badges of membership in and loyalty
to opposing groups. At that point the stake people have in protecting their
status in their group will compete with, and likely overwhelm, the one they
have in forming perceptions that align with expert judgments.189
As we have noted,190 there is a striking affinity between the account
Margolis gives of pattern recognition in expert judgment among scientists
and other professionals and Karl Llewellyn’s account of “situation sense” as a
professionalized recognition capacity that enables lawyers and judges to
converge on appropriate legal outcomes despite the indeterminacy of formal
legal rules. We would surmise, based on this study and previous ones,191 a
parallel account of public conflict over judicial decisions.
Lacking lawyers’ “situation sense,” members of the public will not reliably
be able to make sense of the application of legal rules. But members of the
public will presumably have acquired lay prototypes that enable them, most
of the time anyway, to recognize the validity of legal decisions despite their
own inability to verify their correctness or comprehend their relationship to
relevant sources of legal authority.
But just like their capacity to recognize the validity of scientific expert
judgments, the public’s capacity to recognize the validity of expert legal
determinations will be vulnerable to conditions that excite identity-protective
reasoning. When that happens, culturally diverse citizens will experience
disagreement and conflict over legal determinations that do not generate such
disagreement among legal decisionmakers.192
This was the basic theoretical account that informed our study. It was the
basis for our prediction that judges, as experts possessing professional
See Dan Kahan, Why We Are Poles Apart on Climate Change, 488 NATURE 255 (2012).
See supra notes 88–99 and accompanying text.
191 See generally Kahan, Hoffman & Braman, supra note 46 (studying perceptions of a police
chase, and finding that differences in cultural and social groups can have significant effects on
individuals’ perceptions); Kahan, Hoffman, Braman, Evans & Rachlinski, supra note 46 (showing
evidence for cultural cognition affecting individual perceptions of the speech–conduct distinction).
192 See generally Kahan, Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, supra note 9.
189

190
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judgment, would be largely immune to identity-protective cognition when
making in-domain decisions. By accessing their stock of shared prototypes,
judges and lawyers could be expected to reliably attend only to the legally
pertinent aspects of controversies and disregard the impertinent ones that
predictably generate identity-protective cognition in members of the
public—and thus resist cultural polarization themselves in their expert
determinations. That is exactly the result we found in this study.
Because this result was derived from and corroborates a more general
account of the relationship between identity-protective reasoning and
professional judgment, it seems reasonable to imagine that the same
relationship between the two would be observed among other types of
experts, including scientists studying climate change and other societal risks.
On this account, public conflict over climate change and similar issues reflects
a reasoning distortion peculiar to those who lack access to the prototypes or
patterns that enable experts to see how particular problems should be solved.
But since the experts do possess access to those prototypes, their reasoning,
one would predict, is immune to the same form of disruption when they are
making in-domain decisions. This is the basis for our conclusion that the
current study furnishes reason for discounting the assertion that scientists
and other risk-assessment experts should be distrusted because of their
vulnerability to identity-protective cognition.
Discount does not mean dismiss, however. Any judgment anyone forms
on the basis of this study would obviously be subject to revision on the basis
of evidence of even stronger probative value—the strongest, again, being the
results of a study of the relevant class of professionals. 193
At a minimum, though, this study shows that existing studies of the
impact of identity-protective cognition on members of the public have no
probative value in assessing whether the in-domain judgments of climate
scientists or other risk-assessment professionals are being distorted by this
form of bias. Generalizing from studies of members of the public to these
experts would reflect the same question-begging mistake as generalizing from
such studies to judges. The results of this study help illustrate that those who
relied on experiments involving general-public samples to infer that judges

193 Cf. Toby Bolsen, James N. Druckman & Fay Lomax Cook, Citizens’, Scientists’, and Policy
Advisors’ Beliefs About Global Warming, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOCIAL SCI., March 2015, at
271 (reporting data suggesting that scientists are less culturally polarized than members of public on
climate change); J. S. Carlton, Rebecca Perry-Hill, Matthew Huber & Linda S. Prokopy, The
Climate Change Consensus Extends Beyond Climate Scientists, ENVTL. RES. LETTERS (Sept. 24, 2015),
http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/10/9/ 094025/ pdf [http://perma.cc/L246CBEE] (same).
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are influenced by identity-protective cognition were making a mistake.194
Those who rely on how members of the public reason to draw inferences
about the in-domain judgments of scientists are making one, too.
Our study implies, though, that it probably isn’t a mistake to study lawyers
if one wants to learn more about how judges think. Obviously, identityprotective reasoning is only one cognitive dynamic of interest for those
engaged in examining how general mechanisms of information processing
interact with judicial habits of mind. It is arguably the one, though, that raises
the most serious questions about the validity of using samples of lawyers to
do so: lawyers and judges both engage in legal reasoning, but only judges have
real-world experience making legal decisions that can threaten their own and
others’ cultural identities. Thus, our finding that the responses of judges and
lawyers were highly convergent with one another’s—and highly divergent
with those of members of the public and even those of law students—
furnishes grounds for confidence that studies of lawyers can validly be used
to model how judges will perform in reasoning tasks that invoke the form of
professional judgment they share.
D. The “Neutrality Communication Problem”
We have suggested that the results of this study are relevant to the issue
of how identity-protective cognition might affect expert scientists. We now
want to explain how the contribution that identity-protective cognition
makes to conflicts over policy-relevant science can be used to highlight the
practical significance of our study results for the administration of justice.
There is an obvious sense in which the results of this study can be
understood as good news for the justice system. The perception that judges
are “just politicians in robes” is, as we noted, commonplace. The popular view
that judges decide cases on the basis of political or cultural commitments
extrinsic to law is both understandable and distressing. Yet in an experiment
designed to avoid methodological limitations associated with studies that
have purported to corroborate this anxiety, we found evidence that judges of
diverse cultural outlooks can be expected to converge on results in cases that
194 See supra Section I.A. This study also underscores the unreliability of treating imaginative
extrapolation from decision-science research involving the general public as a valid method for
determining the vulnerability of judges to other biases that might constrain their effectiveness in
performing tasks such as applying rules of evidence. This method is useful for generating hypotheses
worthy of testing. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law, 155
U. PA. L. REV. 16 (2006) (discussing whether judges should limit themselves to the same evidence
as juries, and arguing that testing should be done to determine whether judges fall prey to the same
problems of bias that juries do). But when held forth as an “explanation” supported by “scientific
evidence,” this form of exposition confuses story-telling plausibility with empirical proof.
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predictably divide the public. Their job is to decide those sorts of cases
neutrally, and our evidence supports the inference that they have both the
capacity and disposition to carry it out.
That such a result defies public perceptions should not come as any sort
of surprise. Numerous studies have found that members of the general public
themselves can be expected to conform their assessments of evidence and
their interpretation of rules to the stake they have in legal outcomes that
affirm the status of their groups and their own standing within them.195 These
studies, we have emphasized, are not a reliable basis for drawing inferences
about the in-domain reasoning processes of judges. But the one sort of
inference that they do support is that members of the public can be expected
to perceive judges to be biased in cases the outcomes of which are invested
with antagonistic cultural meanings even when the outcomes of those cases
reflect neutral decisionmaking.196
That conclusion is, in fact, the bad news associated with our study results:
the reliable convergence of culturally diverse judges on genuinely neutral
outcomes has no connection at all to how untrained members of the public
perceive the neutrality of those judges’ decisions. Again, because citizens lack
the elements of professional judgment—the “situation sense”—that lawyers
and judges acquire through their training and experience, citizens do not have
the capacity to discern those aspects of the case and the governing legal rules
pertinent to assessing the neutrality or validity of judicial resolutions of them.
On the contrary, in precisely those cases in which public anxiety about the
cultural neutrality of the law is likely to be highest, identity-protective
cognition will predictably disable members of the public from using their
usually reliable lay prototypes of valid decisionmaking to assess cases
outcomes. In that circumstance, no matter how expertly and impartially
judges decide, the sense of the public—or at least those who belong to the
cultural group whose identity is denigrated by the decision—will be disposed
to see judges’ decisions as “politically biased.”197
This problem is exactly parallel to the one that scientists face when
empirical issues on which they possess expertise become entangled in
culturally contested meanings. Obviously, doing valid science does not in
itself communicate the validity of scientific research: people lack the expertise
to see validity for themselves; they must rely on cues and processes that help

See generally Sood, supra note 12.
See Kahan, Cognition of Law, supra note 9, at 59-60; Kahan, Hoffman, Braman, Evans, &
Rachlinski, supra note 46, at 892-93.
197 See Kahan, Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, supra note 9, at 36-37.
195

196
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them to reliably recognize who knows what about what.198 The capacity of
members of the public to interpret those cues is compromised when
propositions of risk or fact become symbols of the status of competing
cultural groups.199 In that sort of “polluted science-communication
environment,”200 just doing valid science—including the part of valid science
that consists of communicating validity to other scientists—will do nothing to
silence public confusion and agitation.
Fixing this science communication problem is the aim of a new science of
science communication.201 This subdivision of decision science uses empirical
methods to identify the various dynamics that enable people to recognize as
valid scientific insights that they could never verify for themselves. It also
aims to understand, empirically, how those processes can be disrupted, and
how society can effectively preempt such disruptions and counteract them
when strategies of prevention fail.
Exploiting the benefits of the science of science communication will
demand appropriate adjustments to myriad institutional practices. The sorts
of conscious interventions necessary to protect the science communication
environment from contamination are not self-executing. An integral part of
the science of science communication, then, is to identify programs of
implementation that appropriately reconfigure the processes for scienceinformed policymaking, the norms of science-generating and -consuming
professions, and the structure of university training of scientists and publicpolicymaking professionals.
The law has a similar communication problem. Doing and communicating
neutral decisionmaking are as different from one another as doing and
communicating valid science. Just as solving the science communication
problem demands scientific knowledge and appropriate institutional reforms,
so solving the law’s neutrality communication problem will require
appropriate acquisition and use of empirical knowledge of a sort aimed at
expanding understanding of how people come to recognize the neutrality of
the law and what law should do to make its neutrality fully recognizable.
There is one critical difference, however, between the science
communication problem and the neutrality communication problem. Unlike
scientists, judges are expected both to make valid decisions and communicate
the validity of their work to the public. It is widely recognized that the
198 See KARL P OPPER , C ONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS : T HE G ROWTH OF
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 8-9, 30, 36 (2d ed. 1965) (criticizing British sensory empiricism, which
posited that the only valid currency of justified belief is personal observation).
199 See Dan M. Kahan, A Risky Science Communication Environment for Vaccines, 342 SCI. 53, 53 (2013).
200 Dan M. Kahan, Why We Are Poles Apart on Climate Change, 488 NATURE 255, 255 (2012).
201 Kahan, supra note 78.
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experience of liberal neutrality in law depends on the public’s confidence that
the law is genuinely impartial. The practice of reason giving reflected in
judicial opinions is understood to be intrinsic to the rule of law precisely
because public assurance of the law’s neutrality depends on their access to a
reasoned account of the neutral, impartial grounds for courts’ decisions.
The legal profession is doing well, our study suggests, in equipping judges
to be neutral decisionmakers. But the very ubiquity and persistence of
conflict over whether judges are in fact deciding cases on neutral grounds is
a testament to how little the profession knows, and how poorly equipped its
members are, to communicate the neutrality of the law. That deficit in lawyers’
“situation sense” is itself a barrier to citizens’ enjoyment of the value that
neutral judicial decisionmaking confers on them.
CONCLUSION
The motivations for conducting the study described in this Article were
two. The first, narrower and more immediate one was to examine whether
judicial decisionmaking is “ideologically biased.” The results of the study,
which was designed to remedy methodological defects that prevent drawing
valid inferences from existing studies, supply reason to discount the pervasive
claim that judges are “politicians in robes.”
The second, more general, and much more generally important, aim was
to demonstrate the need for making judging an evidence-based profession.
Like other experts, judges are endowed with expert professional judgment—
“situation sense,” in Llewellyn’s terms. In law no more than in any other
profession, the use of empirical methods cannot plausibly be viewed as an
alternative to either the role of shared experience in generating professional
judgment or the successful acquisition and proficient use of such judgment
by individual practitioners.
But also like the professional judgment of all other manner of experts, the
suitability of lawyers’ “situation sense” for the decisionmaking task that they
must perform inevitably depends on its being informed by empirical facts, the
nature and significance of which will evade confident detection by casual
reflection. The disciplined methods of observation, measurement, and
inference that are distinctive of science furnish the most reliable basis—the
only reliable basis—for determining what those facts are. The legal profession
comprises norms of collective self-reflection and -assessment that can be
expected to instill in their members the habits of mind and the dispositions
necessary to solve the neutrality communication problem and like challenges,
but only if those processes are informed by valid understandings of how the
world actually works.
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Perfecting the profession of doing justice thus depends on the advent of a
new science of judging.202

202 See Kahan, Cognition of Law, supra note 9; Kahan, Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition,
supra note 17, at 58-71.
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APPENDIX A. REGRESSION MODELS
A. Statutory Interpretation Problems
The hypotheses relating to the impact of identity-protective cognition on
the legal reasoning of the different subject types were tested with multivariate
analyses. The models for Littering and Disclosure appear in Table A1 and
Table A2, respectively. Each model contains predictors for the problem
version (“imm” = 1 for assignment to “immigrant aid,” “imm” = 0 for
assignment to “construction worker”; “pro-life” = 1 for assignment to “prolife center,” = 0 for assignment for “pro-choice center”); for subject type
(dummy coded with member of the public as reference category); the
continuous cultural worldview measures (“hfac” for hierarchy–egalitarianism,
and “ifac” for individualism–communitarianism), each of which is centered
at 0; and appropriate cross-product interaction terms that measure the
interaction of the cultural worldviews and experimental assignments
separately for each subject type. Predictors are added in groups to promote
more ready interpretation of the regression output.
1. Littering Problem
Models 1 and 2 of Table A1 add predictors for assignment to the
“immigrant aid” version of Littering and for cultural worldviews and
corresponding cross-product interactions, respectively. The positive sign of
the coefficient for “imm” (b = 0.33, p < 0.01) indicates that for the subjects
considered as a whole the likelihood of finding a violation was higher in the
“immigrant aid” than in the “construction worker” version of the problem.
The positive coefficients for the two cross-product interaction terms in Model
2—“hfac_x_imm” (b = -0.50, p < 0.01) and “ifac_x_imm” (b = 0.26,
p < 0.05)—indicate that the relative probability of finding a violation in the
“immigrant aid” version as opposed to the “construction worker” version
increased as subjects became more hierarchical and individualistic;
correspondingly, the relative probability of finding a violation in that version
of the problem as opposed to the “construction worker” version decreased as
subjects became more egalitarian and communitarian. Because Models 1 and
2 do not include predictors relating to the types of subjects, they should be
interpreted as effects for subjects “on average.”
The predictors added to Model 3 account for differences between the responses of the various subject types. The substantial improvement in the fit
of the Model (ΔLR χ2 = 143.3(18), p < 0.01) supports the inference that in
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fact the predictors in Model 2 do not operate uniformly across members of
the public, law students, lawyers, and judges.
Table A1: Multivariate Regression Analysis for Littering
Model

1

2
0.34

(3.26)

0.27

(1.69)

-0.08

(-1.12)

-0.34

(-3.41)

0.1

(0.09)

-0.29

(-2.81)

hfac_x_imm

0.50

(4.65)

0.77

(5.32)

ifac_x_imm

0.26

(2.42)

0.46

(3.02)

student

-0.66

(-2.95)

lawyer

-1.32

(-4.24)

Judge

-1.59

(-5.52)

student_x_imm

0.10

(0.31)

lawyer_x_imm

-0.01

(-0.01)

judge_x_imm

-0.01

(-0.04)

hfac_x_student

0.55

(2.30)

hfac_x_lawyer

-0.02

(-0.05)

hfac_x_judge

0.54

(1.94)

ifac_x_student

0.19

(0.93)

ifac_x_judge

0.49

(1.83)

ifac_x_lawyer

0.36

(1.17)

student_x_hfac_x_imm

-0.45

(-1.32)

student_x_ifac_x_imm

-0.42

(-1.32)

lawyer_x_hfac_x_imm

-0.74

(-1.59)

lawer_ifac_x_imm

-0.47

(-1.21)

judge_x_hfac_x_imm

-0.91

(-2.45)

judge_x_ifac_x_imm

-0.63

(-1.59)

Imm

0.33

Hfac
Ifac

LR χ2
ΔLR χ2

10.1(1)

(3.18)

3

53.2(5)

196.5(23)

43.0(4)

143.3(18)

Note: N = 1502. Outcome variable is ruling (1 = violation, 0 = no violation). Predictor estimates are
logit coefficients with z-test statistic indicated parenthetically. Bolded typeface indicates predictor
coefficient, model LR χ2, or incremental change in model LR χ2 is significant at p < 0.05. Listwise
deletion for missing data.
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It is readily apparent from Model 3 that members of the public were more
inclined to find a violation in the “construction worker” version than were
other types of subjects. The predictors for being a student (b = -.66, p < 0.01),
a lawyer (b = -1.32, p < 0.01), and a judge (b = -1.59, p < 0.01) reflect how being
the indicated type of subject as opposed to being a member of the public
influences the probability of finding a violation in the “construction worker”
version of the problem, when cultural worldviews are “controlled for” (i.e.,
when the predictor values for hfac and ifac are set at their mean value, 0).
The coefficients for each of those predictors are negative, indicating that
members of the public, on average, are more inclined to find a violation in
the “construction worker” version of the problem than the other subject
types.
The coefficient for “imm” now reflects how much more likely a member
of the public is to find a violation in “immigrant aid” than in “construction
worker” when that member of the public is “average” in cultural worldview.
The sign of that predictor is positive (b = 0.27), implying that a member of
the public is still more inclined to find a violation in the “immigrant aid”
version, although this propensity is, for what it is worth, only “marginally
significant” (p = 0.09).
Also readily apparent from the output of Model 3 is the impact that
cultural outlooks have on members of the public. The coefficients for both
“hfac” (b = -0.34, p < 0.01) and “ifac” (b = -0.29, p < 0.01), are negative, and
those for “hfac_x_imm” (b = 0.77, p < 0.01), and “ifac_x_imm” (b = 0.46,
p < 0.01), are both positive. These results reflect the strong impact—visible
in the summary data (Figure 5)—that members of the public were inclined
to polarize along the lines consistent with the predicted impact of identityprotective cognition: that is, as they became more hierarchical and
individualistic, members of the public became more inclined to find a
violation in the “immigration-aid” version and less so in the “construction
worker” version; as they became more egalitarian and communitarian, they
displayed the opposite decisionmaking tendency.
The remaining information in the regression is less readily accessible.
Figuring out how much more or less a judge is affected by his cultural
outlooks in either the “immigrant aid” or “construction worker” version of
the problem than is a member of the public or a law student, or a law student
is than a lawyer, or a lawyer than a member of the public or a judge requires
adding appropriate combinations of Model 3 predictors. It is the sign and
magnitude of those sums and not the sign and magnitude of individual
predictor coefficients that must thus be examined to assess the competing
study hypotheses.
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Figure A1: Simulated Probabilities of Finding a Violation in Littering
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Note: Figure A1 is derived from a Monte Carlo simulation based on regression Model 3, Table A1.
Predictors for cultural worldviews set at +1 for both hierarchy and individualism and -1 for both in
the case of “Hierarchical Individualist” (“HI”) and “Egalitarian Communitarian” (“EC”)
decisionmakers, respectively. The curves reflect the probability density distribution for the
predicted probability that the indicated subject type will find a violation in the indicated version of
the problem. The most likely predicted outcome is the probability corresponding to the apex of the
curve; probabilities higher or lower become progressively smaller as one approaches the values at
the extreme tails of the curve.

Statistical simulation furnishes the most straightforward and reliable
means of making the relevant comparisons.203 Figure A1 displays simulated
probability distributions for each of the relevant combination of subject
types, worldviews, and experimental assignments. The distributions reflect
203 See G ELMAN & HILL, supra note 146, at 137-51; King, Tomz & Wittenberg, supra note 148,
at 351-53 (explaining that simulation is preferable to analytical methods because, among other things,
it “can provide accurate answers even when no analytical solutions exist”).
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the entire multivariate normal distribution for the regression model estimates
of the predicted probabilities associated with relevant combinations of
predictors.204
Based on the simulated values, the predicted probability that a member
of the public will find that the defendants committed a violation in the
“immigrant aid” version of the problem is 28% higher (± 14%) if that member
of the public has moderately hierarchical and individualistic values than if
that individual has moderately egalitarian and communitarian ones. By the
same token, the predicted probability that a member of the public will find
that the defendants committed a violation in the “construction worker”
version of the problem is 30% higher (± 12%) if that member of the public has
moderately egalitarian and communitarian values than if that individual has
moderately hierarchical and individualistic ones.
The interaction of the experimental assignment with the cultural
worldviews of student decisionmakers is less dramatic but still evinces modest
effects consistent with identity-protective cognition. The biggest impact is
on a Hierarchical Individualist student, whose predicted probability of
finding a violation is 17% higher (± 28%) in the “construction worker” version
than in the “immigrant aid” version. The difference is not statistically
significant, however, at the conventional p < 0.05 level.
For lawyer and judge decisionmakers, in contrast, the impacts are
inconsistent with identity-protective cognition. Indeed, whether an
Egalitarian Communitarian decisionmaker is a lawyer or a judge, the
predicted probability that he or she will find a violation in the “immigrant
aid” version is higher than it is in the “construction worker” version. If that
decisionmaker is a lawyer, the probability that he or she will find a violation
in the “immigrant aid” worker version is lower if the decisionmaker is a
Hierarchical Individualist than if the decisionmaker is an Egalitarian
Communitarian. These patterns are contrary to the ones associated with
identity-protective cognition, although the magnitudes of all these effects
differ by an amount that is neither practically nor statistically significant.

204

See King, Tomz & Wittenberg, supra note 148, at 349.
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Table A2: Multivariate Regression Analysis for Disclosure
Model
1
2
3

pro-life

0.08 (-0.70)

0.10 (0.91)

0.04 (0.25)

Hfac

-0.10 (-1.30)

0.11 (1.19)

Ifac

-0.09 (-1.12)

-0.07 (-0.72)

hfac_x_pro-life

-0.29 (-2.64)

-0.39 (-2.80)

ifac_x_pro-life

0.22 (2.01)

0.26 (1.78)

Student

1.03 (4.22)

Lawyer

1.48 (5.74)

Judge

1.47 (4.78)

student_x_pro-life

0.12 (0.32)

lawyer_x_pro-life

0.17 (0.38)

judge_x_pro-life

-0.12 (-0.32)

hfac_x_student

-0.27 (-1.11)

hfac_x_lawyer

-0.19 (-0.58)

hfac_x_judge

-0.15 (-0.54)

ifac_x_student

-0.16 (-0.72)

ifac_x_judge

0.00 (-0.01)

ifac_x_lawyer

0.13 (0.43)

student_x_hfac_x_pro-life

0.11 (0.29)

student_x_ifac_x_pro-life

0.31 (0.86)

lawyer_x_hfac

-0.09 (-0.17)

lawer_ifac_x_pro-life

-0.35 (-0.77)

judge_x_hfac_x_pro-life

0.61 (1.51)

judge_x_ifac_x_pro-life

-0.33 (-0.82)

LR χ2
ΔLR χ2

0.5(1)

31.1(5)

182.4(23)

30.1(4)

151.3(18)

Note: N = 1472. Outcome variable is ruling (1 = violation, 0 = no violation). Predictor estimates are
logit coefficients with z-test statistic indicated parenthetically. Bolded typeface indicates predictor
coefficient, model LR χ2, or incremental change in model LR χ2 is significant at p < 0.05. Listwise
deletion for missing data.
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2. Disclosure Problem

Table A2 presents the regression analyses for subject responses to the
Disclosure problem. The coefficient for “pro-life” in Model 1 (b = 0.08,
p = 0.80) is only trivially different from zero, implying that, overall, subjects
were not meaningfully more likely to find a violation in the “pro-life center”
version than the “pro-choice center” version.
Figure A2: Simulated Probabilities of Finding a Violation in Disclosure
Public

Students
HC
pro-choice
EI
pro-life

EI
pro-choice
HC
pro-life

EI
pro-life
EI
pro-choice
HC
pro-choice
HC
pro-life

0

0.25

0.50

0.75

1

0

probability of finding violoation

0.25

0.50

HC
pro-life

EI
pro-life

EI
pro-choice

HC
pro-choice

HC
pro-life

0.50

EI
pro-choice

EI
pro-life

HC
pro-choice

0.25

1

Judges

Lawyers

0

0.75

probability of finding violoation

0.75

probability of finding violoation

1

0

0.25

0.50

0.75

1

probability of finding violoation

Note: The figure is derived from a Monte Carlo simulation based on Regression Model 3, Table A2.
Predictors for cultural worldviews set at +1 for hierarchy and -1 for individualism and -1 for hierarchy
and +1 for individualism in the case of Hierarchical Communitarian (“HC”) and Egalitarian
Individualist (“EI”) decisionmakers, respectively. The curves reflect the probability density
distribution for the predicted probability that the indicated subject type will find a violation in the
indicated version of the problem. The most likely predicted outcome is the probability
corresponding to the apex of the curve; probabilities higher or lower become progressively smaller
as one approaches the values at the extreme tails of the curve.
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Model 2 adds predictors for cultural worldviews. The negative coefficient
for “hfac_x_pro-life” (b = 0.29, p < 0.01) and the positive one for “ifac_x_prolife” (b = .22, p < 0.05) indicate that, for the sample as a whole, subjects
became more disposed to find a violation in the “pro-life center” version
relative to the “pro-choice center” version as their outlooks became more
egalitarian and individualistic and, correspondingly, more disposed to find a
violation in the “pro-choice center” relative to the “pro-life center” version as
their outlooks became more hierarchical and communitarian. These patterns
are again consistent with the predicted influence of identity-protective
cognition.
It is apparent from Model 3 that students (b = 1.03, p < 0.01), lawyers
(b = 1.48, p < 0.01), and judges (b = 1.47, p < 0.01) were all more disposed to
find a violation in the “pro-choice center” version than were members of the
public. But again, simulating predicted probabilities is the most
straightforward way to extract from the model information relevant to the
study hypotheses (Figure A2).
The effects are less dramatic than in Littering, but the simulated values
again support the inference of identity-protective cognition in the case of
members of the public. A moderately egalitarian and individualistic member
of the public is 17% (± 13) more likely to find a violation in the “pro-life
center” version than in the “pro-choice version” of the problem, whereas a
moderately hierarchical communitarian individual is 15% (± 10) less likely to
do so.
The simulated probabilities likewise suggest that identity-protective
cognition influenced the reasoning of the students. An egalitarian
individualist student decisionmaker, for example, is 15% (± 13) more likely to
find a violation in the pro-life center version than in the pro-choice center
version.
Again, the effects for lawyer and judge decisionmakers are inconsistent
with the inference of identity-protective cognition. None of the relevant
differences in the probabilities of finding a violation conditional on
worldview and experimental assignment are practically or statistically
significant. This conclusion is illustrated by the high degree of overlaps in
the relevant probability density distributions.
B. Risk Perceptions
Table A3 sets forth separate regression models for each of the societalrisk perception scales.205 Predictors include the continuous cultural
205

See supra subsection III.A.3.
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worldview measures (“hfac” for hierarchy–egalitarianism and “ifac” for
individualism–communitarianism), each of which is centered at 0; each
subject type (dummy coded with member of the public as reference
category); and appropriate cross-product interaction terms that measure the
interaction of the cultural worldviews and each subject type separately.
Environmental risk perceptions are known to polarize individuals who are
relatively hierarchical and individualistic, on the one hand, and those who are
relatively egalitarian and communitarian on the other.206 The regression
model for the environmental risk scale—a composite of the subjects’
responses to items assessing their perception of the risks associated with
global warming, nuclear power, air pollution, and water pollution—
corroborates that the risk perceptions of members of the public fit this
pattern. The negative coefficients for “hfac” (b = -0.45, p < 0.01) and “ifac”
(b = -0.25, p < 0.01) show that subjects who were members of the general
population sample became more skeptical of environmental risk as they
became more hierarchical and individualistic, and more risk-sensitive as they
became more egalitarian and communitarian.
In general, law students, lawyers, and judges were less concerned than
members of the public with environmental risks. That conclusion is reflected
in the negative coefficients of the predictors for those subject types (b = -0.27,
p < 0.01; b = -0.44, p < 0.01; and b = -0.18, p < 0.01, respectively), which reflect
the impact on environmental risk perceptions of being one of those types of
subjects as opposed to a member of the public, when cultural worldviews are
“controlled for” (by the setting of the predictor values for hfac and ifac at 0,
their means).
Social deviancy risks—those associated with recreational drug use, with
premarital sex, and with policies to combat domestic terrorism—generate
polarization among individuals whose worldviews are hierarchical and
communitarian, on the one hand, and those whose worldviews are egalitarian
and individualistic, on the other.207 The regression analysis is consistent with
this expectation, although the coefficients for the hierarchy–egalitarianism
predictor (b = 0.15, p < 0.01) and the individualism–communitarian predictor
(b = 0.02, p = 0.33) indicate that for members of the public, all of the variance
between individuals with these outlooks could be attributed to differences
along the hierarchy–egalitarian worldview dimension. This was likely a result
of the loss of strength in the worldview predictors associated with the
See generally Kahan, supra note 13.
Kahan & Braman, supra note 111 ; see also Wildavsky & Dake, supra note 125, at 44 (noting
that “adherents of hierarchy perceive acts of social deviance to be dangerous,” while egalitarians
“show much less concern” about such acts).
206
207
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relatively low degree of variance with respect to the social deviancy risks in
the general population, combined with the modest reliability of the two-item
abbreviated version of the individualism–communitarianism scale. It is clear
from the cross-product interaction terms, however, that differences in the
communitarian–individualism predictor did contribute to variance for
members of the student sample (b = -0.10, p < 0.05). It is also clear that being
a student (b = -0.50, p < 0.01) and being a lawyer (b = -0.47, p < 0.01), but not
being a judge (b = -0.04, p = 0.40), as opposed to being a member of the public
predicted less concern with social deviancy risks when worldviews were held
constant at their mean.
Table A3: Multivariate Regression Analysis for Societal Risk
Perceptions.

Environmental
hfac
ifac
student
lawyer
judge
mhfac_x_student
hfac_x_lawyer
mhfac_x_judge
ifac_x_student
ifac_x_lawyer
ifac_x_judge
Constant
R2

-0.45
-0.25
-0.27
-0.44
-0.18
0.10
0.19
0.13
0.04
0.18
0.01
0.16
0.31

(-20.48)
(-10.42)
(-5.22)
(-7.03)
(-3.49)
(1.81)
(3.58)
(1.97)
(0.90)
(3.30)
(0.20)
(-6.50)

Social deviance
0.15
0.02
-0.50
-0.47
-0.04
-0.04
0.04
0.03
-0.10
0.02
-0.04
0.16
0.18

(7.17)
(0.97)
(-10.12)
(-7.84)
(-0.85)
(-0.85)
(0.73)
(0.52)
(-2.03)
(0.40)
(-0.62)
(6.58)

Note: N = 1523. The dependent variables are indicated societal risk scales. Regression weights are
unstandardized OLS coefficients, with corresponding t-statistic indicated parenthetically. Bold
typeface denotes that the indicated coefficient or model R2 is statistically significant at p < 0.05.

Again, interpretation of the information in the regression models in
relation to the study hypotheses requires considering the impact of
appropriate combinations of predictors. Figure A1 graphically reports the
regression model–estimated impacts of subjects’ worldviews on their risk
perceptions.
The results corroborate the idea that the risk perceptions of all subject
types varied in patterns consistent with the inference that cultural cognition
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shapes their processing of information about the relevant classes of risk. The
impacts vary in size. For example, the estimated impact on members of the
public is larger than that of the other subject types for environmental risks
and smaller than the estimated impact on the other subject types for social
deviancy risks.
But unlike the results observed in relation to the legal problems, the
impact of cultural worldviews is manifest and substantial for all subject types.
The results do not furnish support, then, for the hypothesis that either the
professional judgment characteristic of lawyers and judges or the experience
of being a judge meaningfully counteracts identity-protective reasoning for
out-of-domain judgments.
Figure A3: Societal Risks
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Public

-1

0
Perceived risk

-1

EC

HI

1 -1

0
Perceived risk

Lawyers
HI

Public

Students
EC

HI

Social deviancy risks

EC

1 -1
0
Perceived risk

-1

0
Perceived risk

1 -1

Lawyers

Judges
EC
HC

HI

0
Perceived risk

EI

HC

1

Students
HC

1

-1

0
Perceived risk

1

Judges

EI

0
Perceived risk

EI

HC

1 -1

EI

0
Perceived risk

1

Note: The curves reflect the probability density distribution for the estimated score on the indicated
societal risk scale. Scores on the scales are normalized, with the mean set at 0 and with units in
standard deviations. Predictors for cultural worldviews set at +1 for both hierarchy and individualism
for “Hierarchical Individualist” (“HI”); at -1 for both for “Egalitarian Communitarian” (“EC”); at
+1 for hierarchy and -1 for individualism in the case of Hierarchical Communitarian (“HC”); and at
-1 for hierarchy and +1 for individualism for Egalitarian Individualist (“EI”), respectively. The most
likely estimated score is the one corresponding to the apex of the curve; probabilities higher or lower
become progressively smaller as one approaches the values at the extreme tails of the curve.
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APPENDIX B. STUDY INSTRUMENT
A. Legal Reasoning Problems
Introduction. In this study, we would like to know how you would decide
certain cases if you were a judge. You will first read about the case and then
be asked to tell us how you would rule.
[All subjects do both 1 & 2.
Rotate order of 1 & 2.
Randomize assignment to italicized and underscored conditions.]
1. Littering
You are a trial court judge presiding over a “civil penalty” action filed by
the U.S. government under a law known as the Wildlife Environment
Protection Act (“the Act” or “WEPA”). WEPA prohibits “littering,
disposing, or depositing any form of garbage, refuse, junk, or other debris”
on land designated as a national wildlife preserve. The Government has
charged the defendants, [a group of construction workers,/members of a
immigrants’ aid group,] with 400 separate WEPA violations (each subject to
a $500 fine) for dispersing, and thereafter leaving unattended, 400 ten-gallon
reusable plastic dispensers of drinking water in a wildlife refuge located in
the desert along the United States–Mexico border. [The defendants placed the
dispensers along a fifty-mile stretch in which they had been hired to do work on the
construction of a “border fence” to keep out illegal aliens. The defendants anticipated
drinking the water as they completed their work over a three-month
period./Defendants placed the dispensers along a fifty-mile stretch known to
be traversed by undocumented migrant farm workers. The defendants’
expected the water to be found and consumed by the migrant workers, who
face a high risk of death from dehydration during attempts to cross the
border.]
The issue raised by the defendants’ motion is how to interpret WEPA.
The defendants argue that they had not permanently discarded the plastic
water dispensers but instead temporarily placed them in the desert with an
expectation that they would be used and reused. Such behavior, they argue,
does not count as “littering, disposing, or depositing any form of garbage,
refuse, junk, or other debris” under WEPA.
The Government focuses on the terms “depositing,” “junk,” and “other
debris.” On its reading, the defendants “deposited” the water dispensers in
the desert by placing them there and then leaving them unattended. The
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terms “junk” and “debris,” the government argues, are by design very broad
and cover all manmade materials, including reusable plastic water dispensers,
foreign to the habitat of wildlife in the preserve.
LITTERING_ruling. We are interested in knowing how you might
decide the defendant’s motion to dismiss. That motion should be granted if
the defendant’s interpretation of WEPA is correct but denied if the
Government’s competing interpretation is correct. Of course, if you were
really a judge in the case, you’d do more legal research, and hear arguments
from the parties. But at this point, based on the materials you’ve read, which
of these two rulings do you think you would make, and how confident do you
think you’d be in your decision?
Select one:
( ) Based on my analysis of the statue, I would conclude that the
defendants DID violate WEPA.
( ) Based on my analysis of the statue, I would conclude that the
defendants did NOT violate WEPA.
2. Disclosure
You are one judge of three on an appellate court. D, a former state police
officer, is appealing his conviction under a state law known as the
Government Information Disclosure Act (“Act” or “GIDA”). Evidence at
trial shows that D told his sister, the owner of [a noncommercial “family
planning” center that provides free information on birth control and abortion
services/a religious “family planning” center that counsels women on
alternatives to abortion], that C, an applicant for a job at the center, belonged
to a local [anti-abortion/abortion-rights] group.
The relevant language of GIDA states:
No government employee shall disclose to anyone outside the
government confidential information relating to an identifiable private
citizen unless such disclosure is subject to a statutory exception. Any
government employee who knowingly violates this Act shall be guilty of a class
C Felony.
The information about C’s membership in the [anti-abortion/abortionrights] group came from a police investigatory file. There is no dispute that
the information was “confidential” under GIDA and not subject to any of the
law’s exceptions (for example, the one allowing disclosure “when necessary
to avert an imminent threat to public health or safety”).
Testifying on his own behalf, D admitted that he “knew” that disclosure
“was against departmental policy on confidential investigatory files,” but
stated that he “had no idea” GIDA existed, and hence didn’t “know”
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disclosure violated that or any other statute. He testified that he released the
information about C’s group membership because he was “outraged” that C,
in light of his [anti-abortion/abortion-rights] activities, would seek
employment at the family-planning service operated by D’s sister.
The issue before the appeals court is a narrow one: under GIDA, what
exactly does the prosecution have to prove for a jury to find a defendant
“knowingly violated this Act”?
At trial, the defense requested the court to issue an instruction to the jury
stating, “Because a person commits a crime under GIDA only when he
‘knowingly violates’ the Act, you should return a verdict of guilty only if you
find beyond a reasonable doubt that D knew his conduct violated GIDA.”
The court rejected this request. Instead it instructed the jury, “Because a
person commits a crime under GIDA only when he ‘knowingly violates’ the
Act, you should return a verdict of ‘guilty’ only if you find beyond a reasonable
doubt that D (1) knew he was disclosing government information that (2) he
knew was ‘confidential’ and that (3) he knew ‘related to a private citizen.’” The
court told the jury that it “need not find, however, that D (4) knew his conduct
violated GIDA or any other criminal law.”
If the court of appeals finds that the trial court’s instruction reflected a
correct reading of the Act, the court of appeals will uphold the conviction. If
the court of appeals finds the trial court’s instruction was incorrect, the court
of appeals will reverse the conviction and order a new trial at which the trial
court will be required to give the instruction requested by the defense.
DISCLOSURE_ruling. We are interested in knowing how you might
decide this case if you were on the court of appeals. Of course, if you were
really a judge in the case, you would do more legal research, hear arguments
from the parties, and consult with your fellow judges. But at this point, based
on the materials you’ve read, which of these two rulings do you think you
would make, and how confident do you think you’d be in your decision?
Select one:
( ) Based on my analysis of the statue, I would conclude that the only facts
the prosecution has to prove are (1) that the defendant employee knew he or
she was disclosing information; (2) that the defendant employee knew that
the information was “confidential”; and (3) that the defendant employee
knew the information “related to” an “identifiable private citizen.”
( ) Based on my analysis of the statute, I would conclude that in a criminal
case under GIDA the prosecution must prove not only that the defendant
knew that he or she was disclosing information that he or she knew was
confidential and knew related to an identifiable private citizen; it must also
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prove that the defendant employee knew that disclosure of such information
would violate GIDA.
B. Risk Perceptions
Introduction. Now we would like to ask you about your views about risks.
As individuals and as a society, we face a number of possible hazards. Some
threaten people’s health, safety, or prosperity directly. Others threaten
health, safety, or prosperity indirectly through the damage they can impose
on the environment or the economy. How much risk do you believe each of
the following poses to human health, safety, or prosperity? [0 “no risk at all”;
1 “Very low risk”; 2 “Low risk”; 3 “Between low and moderate risk”; 4
“Moderate risk”; 5 “Between moderate and high risk”; 6 “High risk”; 7 “Very
high risk.”]
[RANDOMIZE ORDER]
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

AIRPOLLUTION. Air pollution
WATERPOLLUTION. Water pollution
NUKERISK. Nuclear power
MARYJRISK. Legalization of marijuana
TERROR. Domestic terrorism
DRUG. Illegal drug trafficking
TEENPREG. Teenage pregnancy
WARMING. Global warming
C. Cultural Worldviews

Introduction. Finally, we’d like to ask you about some moral and social
issues.
[Rotate order of A & B, randomize order of items]
A. Dimension 1 (Individualism–Communitarianism)
People in our society often disagree about how far to let individuals go in
making decisions for themselves. How strongly do you agree or disagree with
each of these statements? [1 “Strongly disagree”; 2 “Moderately disagree”; 3
“Slightly disagree”; 4 “Slightly agree”; 5 “Moderately agree”; 6 “Strongly
agree.”]
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1.

Sometimes government needs to make laws that keep people
from hurting themselves.
2. The government should stop telling people how to live their
lives.
B. Dimension 2 (Hierarchy–Egalitarianism)
People in our society often disagree about issues of equality and
discrimination. How strongly you agree or disagree with each of these
statements? [1 “Strongly disagree”; 2 “Moderately disagree”; 3 “Slightly
disagree”; 4 “Slightly agree”; 5 “Moderately agree”; 6 “Strongly agree.”]
1. We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country.
2. Our society would be better off if the distribution of wealth were
more equal.

